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I. INTRODUCfiON 
Presidential signing statements are short documents that 
presidents often issue when they sign a bill. They first appeared 
about two centuries ago, and they have been used routinely since 
the New Deal. Presidents use signing statements to describe a 
bill in general terms; to explain its purpose; to praise the bill's 
sponsors or supporters; to criticize Congress for going too far or 
not far enough in addressing the problem the bill is supposed to 
solve; to advance particular interpretations of specific provisions 
of the bill; to explain how officials in the executive branch will 
implement the bill; to explain how the bill will interact with ex-
isting statutes; and to remind Congress of the president's consti-
tutional powers. A brief controversy about the Reagan admini-
stration's use of signing statements to supplement legislative 
history flared up in the mid-1980s but had no lasting effect. 1 
Hundreds of signing statements have been issued since then but 
until recently no one paid much attention to them. All this 
changed about a year ago, and suddenly the signing statement, as 
an institution, has become a topic of heated political debate. 
In December 2005, President Bush signed into law the De-
tainee Treatment Act, which among other things prohibits the 
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" of any-
one in U.S. custody. In a signing statement, Bush stated that he 
would construe the prohibition "in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary 
executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent 
with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power," sug-
gesting to some people that he might not comply with the prohi-
bition.2 In March 2006, President Bush issued a signing state-
ment for the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, in which he 
asserted that he had the authority to ignore certain reporting re-
quirements.3 Both of these events caught the attention of the 
media. Also, in January 2006, during Justice Samuel Alito's con-
1. Commentators at that time debated the legitimacy of using signing statements 
to express views about a statute's meaning. Compare Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wim-
mer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive 
Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (1987) (criticizing this practice), 
with Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential 
"Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209 (1988) (defending this practice). 
2. See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemen-
tal Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influ-
enza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005). 
3. See Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2005,42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 425 (Mar. 9, 2006). 
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firmation hearings, it was revealed that, as a Justice Department 
lawyer in the Reagan administration, Alito had drafted a memo 
considering how to implement a proposal to use signing state-
ments more frequently to address questions of statutory inter-
pretation.4 Alita's critics argued that the memo showed that, as 
a Supreme Court justice, he would be too friendly to the execu-
tive branch. 
The next step was to link together what might have re-
mained episodic controversies, and connect them to the widely 
credited claim that the Bush administration had taken extreme 
positions on executive authority in its legal defense of its war-on-
terror policies. Several members of the media made this connec-
tion early on,5 but the spark was applied to the fuel on April 30, 
2006, when a Boston Globe article asserted that Bush had "qui-
etly claimed the authority to disregard more than 750 laws en-
acted since he took office," far more than any other president. 6 
This article provoked further controversy, including increasingly 
strident condemnations of the signing statement in the media.7 
In early June, the American Bar Association appointed a task 
force "to examine constitutional and legal issues raised by the 
practice of presidents of the United States of attaching legal in-
terpretations to federal legislation they sign."8 On June 27, the 
Senate held hearings on the signing statement, during which Re-
publican Arlen Specter expressed concerns about Bush's signing 
statements, and Democrat Patrick Leahy called them a "grave 
threat to our constitutional system of checks and balances. "9 
Academics have also leapt into the fray. 10 And in July 2006, the 
4. See Christopher Lee, A/ito Once Made Case for Presidential Power, WASH. 
PosT, Jan. 2, 2006, at All; Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Litigation Strategy Working Group (Feb. 
5, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-
269/ Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LS WG-Ali totoLSW G-Feb 1986. pdf. 
5. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Sign Here: Presidential Signing Statements Are More Than 
Just Execwive Branch Lunacy, SLATE, Jan. 30,2006, http://www.slateuk.com/id/2134919/. 
6. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws; President Cites Powers of 
His Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al. 
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Veto? Who Needs a Veto?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A22; 
Elizabeth Drew, Power Grab, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, June 22, 2006, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19092. 
8. American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and 
the Separation of Powers Doctrine, http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2006). 
9. Jonathan Weisman, Bush's Challenges of Laws He Signed Is Criticized, WASH. 
PosT, June 28, 2006, at A9. 
10. See, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allen Poe, and the Use and 
Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515 (2005) [herein-
after Cooper, Use and Abuse]; Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President's Au-
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ABA task force issued a statement "oppos[ing] as contrary to 
the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of 
powers, a President's issuance of signing statements to claim the 
authority or state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce 
all or part of a law he has signed, or to interpret such a law in a 
manner inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress. "11 
The attack on the institution of signing statements is puzzling. 
Signing statements provide public information about a president's 
views of a statute and thus would seem to promote dialogue and 
accountability. Furthermore, courts pay little attention to signing 
statements; as a result, it is not clear how they can increase the 
president's authority vis-a-vis Congress. Some critics have pointed 
out that signing statements are sometimes instructions to subordi-
nates, and so an aggressive signing statement could, in theory, di-
rect officials in the executive branch, including prosecutors and 
agency personnel, not to enforce statutes on the basis of dubious 
constitutional theories.12 But it is already widely recognized that 
the president has considerable authority to allocate enforcement 
resources by giving priority to some statutes and not to others, 
and to order his agents to enforce statutes according to his inter-
pretations of them. He certainly does not need a signing statement 
to do this; he could just write a memorandum to his subordinates. 
If his subordinates fail to enforce the law properly, they might be 
compelled to act by courts, or Congress might retaliate; whether 
the failure was the result of a signing statement or some other or-
der or document is immaterial. 
All of this suggests that the real concern is not with the insti-
tution of signing statements but with the Bush administration's 
underlying views of executive power. Unfortunately, the media 
and even much of the academic work on signing statements ig-
nore this distinction, and instead imply that the signing state-
ment is intrinsically suspect. The ABA task force report, for ex-
thority to Refuse to Enforce the Law (American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, 
June 2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kinkopf-Signing%20Statements 
%20and%20Prcsident's%20Authority.pdf; Richard A. Epstein, The Problem with Presi-
dential Signing Statements, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 16, 2006, at 5. 
11. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, REPORT WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements 
/aba_final_signlng_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf [hereinafter ABA 
TASK FORCE]. The ABA's House of Delegates approved the task force's proposed reso-
lutions, after amending them to make clear that what was opposed was the "misuse" of 
signing statements. The amended version is available at http://www.coherentbabble. 
com/signingstatements/ ABAresolamended.pdf. 
12. See, e.g., Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10; Epstein, supra note 10. 
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ample, offers itself as a critique of the signing statement but is 
really an argument that the president has an obligation to en-
force all statutes that are enacted- an entirely different argu-
ment which, incidentally, is much more complex than the task 
force's two-page analysis suggests. 13 A possible reason for this 
state of affairs is that the Bush administration's constitutional 
claims are extremely hard to evaluate, as a matter of political 
and constitutional theory, so it is tempting to use the signing 
statement as a kind of proxy for the Bush administration's un-
derlying constitutional claims. The number of challenges in the 
signing statements is taken as a quantitative index of the Bush 
administration's excesses, with the extreme nature of a few of 
the signing statements used to bolster this claim. In a now forgot-
ten episode of the Clinton administration, Republican critics 
similarly complained that Clinton issued too many executive or-
ders and directives to agencies, and used them to circumvent 
Congress's powers. 14 The problem with this argument is the 
same as the problem with the argument against signing state-
ments: the relevant question is not how many documents are is-
sued, but the content of the documents, which is much harder to 
criticize and evaluate than the number. 
In this article, we try to clear up some of the controversy 
over signing statements in general and the Bush administration's 
use of them in particular. In doing so, we make two principal 
contributions to the debate. First, we present a more nuanced 
empirical assessment of the Bush administration's use of signing 
statements, focusing in particular on a quantitative and qualita-
tive comparison of the signing statement practices of President 
Bush and President Clinton. Second, we use positive political 
theory- the most sophisticated work on legislative institutions 
13. See ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 18-19. We criticize the arguments be-
low. For now, we will just point out that the task force makes the broad argument that 
the President can never refuse to enforce statutes that he believes are unconstitutional, 
without attempting to reconcile this position with the substantial legal and historical ma-
terials that suggest the contrary, including materials surveyed in an Office of Legal Coun-
sel memorandum by Walter Dellinger that the task force cites and quotes from. See id. at 
13. At one point in its report, however, the task force appears to recognize that some-
times it will be appropriate for a president to decline to enforce a statutory provision he 
believes to be unconstitutional. See id. at 23. 
14. See KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 219 (2001); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2294-95 (2001). For some Clinton-era media reports, see Jonathan 
Weisman, Wielding the Power of the President's Pen, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 22, 1999, at 
3A; Editorial, The Intruders, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2000, at A22 ("This final year is going 
to bring a paroxysm of regulatory intrusion-through agency actions or Mr. Clinton's 
continued abuse of executive orders."). 
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and statutory interpretation-to assess the institutional implica-
tions of signing statements. 
Part II briefly describes the history of signing statements and 
considers in some detail the Bush administration's practice. Al-
though President Bush has not issued an unusual number of sign-
ing statements, he has challenged an unusually high number of 
statutory provisions within his statements. Critics contend that this 
behavior shows that the Bush administration has significantly 
broader views of executive power than prior presidents. While 
this contention might be true, the text of the signing statements do 
not by themselves provide compelling support for it. For the most 
part, the claims made in President Bush's signing statements-
including claims relating to the "unitary executive" -are similar to 
the claims made by other recent presidents, such as President 
Clinton. In addition, there are other plausible explanations for the 
Bush administration's high number of challenges. 
In Part III, we reject the legal criticisms of the signing 
statement that have been advanced by a few scholars, politicians, 
and journalists. This is mainly a stage-setting exercise because it 
turns out that the most plausible critiques of the signing state-
ment are not formalistic legal arguments but are ones based on 
more general institutional concerns. Part IV addresses these in-
stitutional arguments, which can be found mainly in the positive 
political theory literature. We argue that these institutional ar-
guments, on inspection, turn out to be weak and that the institu-
tion of the signing statement does not present a serious threat to 
either the separation of powers or the legislative process. 
II. THE SIGNING STATEMENT: BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY PRIOR TO BUSH II 
Presidents have issued signing statements since early in U.S. 
history, starting with James Monroe. 15 Despite early historical 
precedent, the signing statement did not come into widespread 
use until the twentieth century. According to statistics compiled 
by the political scientist Christopher Kelley, Hoover issued 12 
signing statements; FDR issued 51; Truman issued 118; Eisen-
hower issued 145; Kennedy issued 80; and Johnson issued 302. 
15. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Re-
viving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 929 n.294 (1994); Christo-
pher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 57 (2003) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University). 
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The remaining presidents up until Bush II issued between 100 
and 400 signing statements during their administrations, averag-
ing about 35 to 60 per year. 16 
Presidents use signing statements for diverse purposes. 
Many signing statements express general policy views without 
asserting that the bill must be interpreted or limited in some 
fashion. President Truman, for example, declared that various 
provisions of the Displaced Persons Act (which granted visas to 
certain people displaced by hostilities during World War II) 
"form a pattern of discrimination and intolerance wholly incon-
sistent with the American sense of justice." 17 Presidents fre-
quently sign legislation while declaring that the legislation does 
not go far enough toward solving the problem at hand, and re-
questing Congress to consider additional legislative proposals in 
the future. In his signing statement for the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996, President Clinton complained 
that Congress did not adopt many of his proposals, including 
provisions to expand the wiretapping authority of law enforce-
ment agencies and to ban "cop-killer bullets," and asked Con-
gress to reconsider its decisions in future legislation. 18 Many 
other signing statements have thanked constituents, praised or 
condemned members of Congress, and praised members of the 
executive branch as well as the administration itself. 19 These 
types of signing statements have political value but no legal ef-
fect, and so we will not address them further. 
The kinds of signing statements that have produced contro-
versy in recent years also have substantial precedents in earlier 
administrations. We can divide these signing statements into two 
types. First, constitutional signing statements declare that the 
president will interpret a statute narrowly in order to avoid consti-
tutional difficulties or not enforce a provision that the president 
believes is unconstitutional. President Truman interpreted a bill 
that provided for loans to Spain as an "authorization" rather than 
as a "directive" apparently because he believed that the latter 
16. Kelley, supra note 15, at 192. We rely heavily on Kelley's valuable history in this 
part. Other useful sources on the history of signing statements include PHILLIP J. 
COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT 
ACTION (2002); May, supra note 15, at 928-69. 
17. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Displaced Persons Act, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 382,383 (June 25, 1948). 
18. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996). 
19. COOPER, supra note 16, at 213-15. 
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would violate his constitutional power over foreign affairs.20 
Presidents Ford and Carter frequently used si~ning statements to 
deny the constitutionality of legislative vetoes. President Reagan 
stated that a statutory provision that purported not to recognize 
the PLO would be interpreted as nonbinding because otherwise it 
would conflict with the president's recognition power.22 President 
Clinton stated that the Department of Justice would not enforce a 
provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that prohibited 
the transmission of certain abortion-related speech over the 
Internet because the provision violated the First Amendment.23 
Second, interpretive (or legislative history) signing statements 
argue that ambiguous provisions of a statute have a particular 
meaning, based on what the president understands (or claims) 
the purpose of the statute to have been. President Truman inter-
preted a labor statute that provided an ambiguous good-faith de-
fense to employers so that the employer would have the burden 
of proof and could not avoid liability merely by showing that it 
did not intend to violate a rule.Z4 President Reagan interpreted a 
supplemental appropriations bill so that its restrictions on the 
promulgation of regulations would apply only to the type of 
regulations specifically identified in the bill and not to the regu-
latory program to which they were related.Z5 President George 
H.W. Bush's signing statement for the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
advanced a narrow definition of disparate impact by endorsinR 
the statement of a Republican senator in the legislative history. 
President Clinton provided an interpretation of an ambiguous 
term in the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994, saying 
only that his interpretation was "[ c)onsistent with the clear in-
tent of the Act." 27 In these cases, the president provides his un-
derstanding of what the bill means, without trying to appeal to 
his constitutional powers. 
20. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Bernard 
M. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President app. at para. 9 (Nov. 3, 1993), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/signing.htm. 
21. Kelley, supra note 15, at 76. 
22. !d. at 45 (citing Statement on Signing the International Security and Develop-
ment Cooperation Act of 1985, 2 PUB. PAPERS 983 (Aug. 8, 1985)). 
23. Kelley, supra note 15, at 156. 
24. !d. at 62 (citing Statement on Signing Hobbs Bill, 1 Pus. PAPERS 336 (July 3, 
1946)). 
25. Statement on Signing the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986, 2 
Pl'B. PAPERS 906 (July 2, 1986). 
26. Kelley, supra note 15, at 134-35. 
27. Statement on Signing the Federal Workforce Manufacturing Act of 1994, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 561 (March 30, 1994). 
2006] PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 315 
Christopher Kelley argues that the history of the use of the 
signing statement reflects the rise of the theory of the "unitary 
executive," which he traces to the Reagan administration?8 We 
would put the argument differently. The increase in the fre-
quency of the use of the signing statement is related to the rise of 
the national government beginning with the New Deal and the 
concomitant transfer of power from Congress to the president. 
As the federal government became larger and claimed for itself 
greater power over areas of life traditionally left to the states, it 
became necessary for Congress to pass more, or more far-
reaching or comprehensive, statutes. With more statutes, there 
would be more opportunities for conflict between Congress's 
and the president's constitutional powers, and more sources of 
legislative ambiguity. Relatedly, this period also saw the creation 
of independent agencies with an uncertain relationship to presi-
dential authority. Presidents have naturally sought to defend 
their constitutional prerogatives and to advance interpretations 
of ambiguous statutes that might otherwise be applied inconsis-
tently with these prerogatives. The signing statement became an 
instrument with which they have discharged these functions. 
At the same time, as the national government grew, much of 
the day-to-day regulatory power moved from Congress to the 
president. Congress created enormous agencies, placed them in 
the executive branch, and ordered the agencies to issue regula-
tions. Congress transferred this authority to the executive be-
cause it lacked the institutional capacity to make the kind of day-
to-day regulation that it believed necessary in a modern, national 
economy, but it also tried to retain as much oversight control as 
it could. These efforts led to repeated clashes with presidents, 
who were willing to administer the regulatory edifice but be-
lieved that congressional micromanaging violated their constitu-
tional powers. Signing statements became one of the ways that 
presidents have asserted their constitutional understandings. 
Thus, the increasingly frequent use of signing statements since 
FDR can be attributed to the gradual transfer of authority from 
Congress to the president as well as the growth of the national 
government itself. Indeed, many other indicia of executive 
power also increased during this period. For example, presidents 
used executive orders very rarely in the nineteenth century, but 
28. Kelley, supra note 15, at 184. For discussion of this theory, sec infra note 74 and 
accompanying text. 
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frequently during the twentieth, with their greatest use occurring 
during the FDR and Truman administrations.29 
The Reagan administration continued the practice of earlier 
administrations but in a somewhat more aggressive fashion. 
Reagan's attorney general, Edwin Meese, argued more vigor-
ously and explicitly than any of his predecessors that the presi-
dent's views on the Constitution, whether put in signing state-
ments or elsewhere, should be given significant weight.30 Meese 
also argued that signing statements were a legitimate form of 
legislative history, on which courts should rely when interpreting 
statutes, regardless of whether the signing statement reflects the 
president's constitutional or policy views about the statute in 
question.31 We conjecture that the rise of this more aggressive 
use of the signing statement resulted from efforts to reclaim ex-
ecutive power in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the 
congressional reaction of the 1970s, which involved the enact-
ment of numerous laws intended to constrain the executive-
including the War Powers Resolution, the Forei9n Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, and the Anti-Impoundment Act. 2 
B. BUSH II 
Like the signing statements of other recent presidents, 
President Bush's signing statements fall into three overlapping 
categories: statements made for public relations or political pur-
poses; statements that express constitutional objections to or 
concerns about statutory provisions and thereby either suggest 
that they are not binding on the president or that they will be in-
terpreted in a manner that avoids the objection or concern; and 
statements that express a view about the meaning of an ambigu-
ous statutory provision. 
Bush has often used signing statements at least partially for 
political or public relations purposes. For example, of the 
twenty-four signing statements that Bush issued in 2001, half of 
them were purely for political or public relations purposes, al-
though it appears that there are fewer pure politicaVpublic rela-
tions signing statements in subsequent years. In signing into law 
29. See MAYER, supra note 14, at 71. 
30. See COOPER, supra note 16, at 201-03; Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Consti-
twion, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). 
31. The academic debate of the time focused on the question whether a signing 
statement reflecting policy should be used as legislative history and neglected the consti-
tutional signing statement, which is the focus of the debate today. 
32. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 423 (2004). 
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a bill that repealed a regulation concerning ergonomics, Bush 
stated that the "measure repeals an unduly burdensome and 
overly broad regulation" and further criticized the regulation as 
something that "would have cost both large and small employers 
billions of dollars and presented employers with overwhelming 
compliance challenges. "33 This statement made no claim about 
the meaning of statutory provisions and did not raise any consti-
tutional objections about the bill. Similarly, in signing a supple-
mental appropriations bill in 2001, Bush "commend[ed] the 
Congress for expeditiously providing critical resources needed to 
improve our support for our men and women in the military 
while maintaining a strict fiscal discipline."34 The use of signing 
statements to make these sorts of political or public relations 
statements is not controversial. 
Many of Bush's signing statements refer to constitutional 
objections or concerns implicated by one or more statutory pro-
visions (often in addition to making public relations statements). 
These constitutional objections typically relate to asserted en-
croachments on executive authority. For example, Bush's state-
ments have objected to: 
• Provisions directing the executive branch to submit propos-
als or recommendations to Congress on particular topics, 
on the ground that they interfere with the constitutional au-
thority of the president to recommend "such measures as 
the President shall judge necessary or expedient. "35 
• Restrictions on the president's ability to appoint officers 
or vest appointment authority in entities other than the 
president, on the ground that they violate the Appoint-
ments Clause.36 
• Provisions requiring the submission of information to 
Congress, on the ground that they may interfere with the 
president's authority to withhold information for various 
reasons, such as harm to national security.37 
33. Statement on Signing Legislation To Repeal Federal Ergonomics Regulations, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 269, 269 (Mar. 20, 2001). 
34. Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2001, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 908, 908 (July 24, 2001). 
35. See, e.g., Statement on Signing Legislation to Provide for Improvement of Fed-
eral Education Research, Statistics, Evaluation, Information, and Dissemination, and for 
Other Purposes, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1995, 1995 (Nov. 5, 2002). 
36. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Ur-
ban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2006,41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1800 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
37. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
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• Provisions directing the executive branch to take particu-
lar positions in international negotiations or before in-
ternational bodies, or to report on international negotia-
tions, on the ground that they interfere with the 
president's management of foreign affairs. 38 
• Limitations on the use of U.S. armed forces, on the 
ground that they interfere with the president's Com-
mander in Chief authority. 39 
• Provisions that regulate how actions are to be taken 
within the executive branch, on the ground that they in-
terfere with the president's authority to supervise the 
"unitary executive branch. "40 
• Legislative veto and approval provisions on the ground 
that they are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in INS v. Chadha.41 
Many of Bush's signing statements refer to multiple constitu-
tional concerns, with the highest number often being raised in con-
nection with appropriations bills. In signing an appropriations bill in 
November 2001, for example, Bush raised constitutional concerns 
about requirements regarding the organization of the Department of 
Justice's efforts to combat terrorism; a requirement that the presi-
dent submit a legislative proposal to Congress concerning compensa-
tion for victims of terrorism; and a prohibition on the use of appro-
priated funds for cooperation with, or assistance or other support to, 
the International Criminal Court. He also noted at the end of his 
signing statement that "several other provisions of the bill unconsti-
tutionally constrain my authority regarding the conduct of diplomacy 
and my authority as Commander-in-Chief," and that he would "ap-
tion Act of2004, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2993 (Dec. 17, 2004). 
38. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1658 (Sept. 30, 2002); Statement on Signing 
the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
2006,41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1718 (Nov. 14, 2005). 
39. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 2005,40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2673 (Oct. 28, 2004). 
40. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 40 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2924 (Dec. 8, 2004). 
41. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1576 (Nov. 10, 
2003). For additional discussion of the types of constitutional concerns raised in Presi-
dent Bush's signing statements, see Time Change-Presidential Signing Statements: 
Hearing on Presidential Signing Statements Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 
27, 2006) [hereinafter Time Change] (statement of Michelle E. Boardman, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice), available at 
http://judiciary.senatc.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1969; Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10, 
at 522. 
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ply these provisions consistent with my constitutional responsibili-
ties. "42 In his signing statements for the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2004 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Bush 
referred to constitutional concerns relating to dozens of provisions.43 
Most of the time, when Bush has identified a constitutional 
concern, he has stated that he will construe the statutory provi-
sion in question in a manner to avoid the concern. For example, 
in signing the Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention, and 
Control Act of 2001, Bush noted that a section of the Act re-
quired the Secretary of Agriculture to submit certain reports to 
committees and subcommittees of Congress, and he explained 
that this section "will be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
the constitutional authority of the President to recommend to 
the consideration of the Congress such measures as the Presi-
dent shall judge necessary and expedient."44 Similarly, in signing 
an appropriations act for the Department of the Interior, he 
noted that "[ s )everal provisions in the bill purport to require 
congressional approval before executive branch execution of as-
pects of the bill," and that he would "interpret such provisions to 
require notification only, since any other interpretation would 
contradict the Supreme Court ruling in INS v. Chadha. "45 
For many of his constitutional objections, Bush has ad-
dressed the issue by interpreting statutory language that other-
wise appears to be mandatory as being merely advisory. For ex-
ample, in signing the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act in 
2002, he stated that a provision that called for the Department of 
State to provide briefings to congressional committees concern-
ing certain discussions with foreign governments 
shall be construed as advisory only, given the constitutional 
powers of the President to supervise the executive branch and 
to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, which includes the au-
thority to determine what information about international ne-
42. Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, 2 PL!B. PAPERS 1458, 1459 
(Nov. 28, 2001). 
43. Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 40 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. Doc. 137 (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/print.php?pid= 72537; Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2924 (Dec. 8, 2004). 
44. Statement on Signing the Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention, and 
Control Act of 2001, 1 PUB. PAPERS 575,575 (May 24, 2001). 
45. Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1346, 1346 (Nov. 5, 2001). 
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gotiations may, in the public interest, be made available to the 
Congress and when such disclosure should occur. 46 
Similarly, in signing the National Science Foundation Authoriza-
tion Act of 2002, he noted that a section of the bill "purports to 
condition authorizations of certain appropriations on a subse-
quent determination by the Congress of the existence of success-
ful progress by the executive branch toward specified goals," and 
that "[t]he executive branch shall construe the purported condi-
tion as advisory, since any other construction would be inconsis-
tent with the principles enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1983 in INS v. Chadha."47 
In some signing statements, Bush has indicated that he 
would at least partially comply with statutory provisions that he 
thought were constitutionally problematic, particularly provi-
sions relating to notice or reporting to Congress, "as a matter of 
comity." He did so, for example, in connection with the above-
noted objection to the reporting provision in the Foreign Opera-
tions Appropriations Act in 2002, stating "[t)he Secretary of 
State will, however, as a matter of comity between the executive 
and legislative branches, keep the Congress appropriately in-
formed of the matters addressed by [this section]. "48 Similarly, in 
signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2004, 
Bush noted that some sections "provide for notice to the Con-
gress of relocation of activities between military installations, ini-
tiation of a new installation abroad, or U.S. military exercises in-
volving $100,000 in construction costs," that "[t]he Supreme 
Court of the United States has stated that the President's author-
ity to classify and control access to information bearing on na-
tional security flows from the Constitution and does not depend 
upon a legislative grant of authority," and that "[a]lthough no-
tice can be provided in most situations as a matter of comity, 
situations may arise, especially in wartime, in which the Presi-
dent must act promptly under his constitutional grants of execu-
tive power and authority as Commander in Chief while protect-
ing sensitive national security information. "49 
46. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 49, SO (Jan. 10, 
2002). 
47. Statement on Signing the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 
2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2178, 2178 (Dec. 19, 2002). 
48. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 49, SO (Jan. 10, 
2002). 
49. Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004, 39 
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Bush has only rarely issued statements interpreting a statu-
tory provision for non-constitutional reasons. He has done so to 
address accidental references or omissions in statutory lan-
guage.50 He has also occasionally done so to clarify statutory ref-
erences.51 Most famously, in his signing statement for the De-
tainee Treatment Act in 2005, Bush asserted that the restrictions 
on habeas corpus in the Act applied to pending cases,52 a propo-
sition subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court.53 In signing 
the Corporate Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency 
Act of 2002, also known as "Sarbanes-Oxley," Bush issued two 
signing statements, one formal and the other informal. In the in-
formal statement, he said that he would construe a whistleblower 
protection provision narrowly. After subsequent pressure from 
Congress and interest groups, the executive branch changed its 
position and accepted a broader interpretation of the provision. 54 
C. BUSH II V. CLINTON 
It has been widely asserted that the Bush administration's 
practice with respect to signing statements has been unusual in 
nature and unprecedented in number. The press has frequently 
reported that Bush has issued a record number of signing state-
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. lliRO. !fiR() (Nov. 22, 2003). 
50. See Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Re-
form Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. ~22, ~22 (May 14, 2002) ("Section 
2(4)(G) of the Act defines as a Federal Jaw enforcement agency the 'Coastal Security 
Service.' Because no such agency exists, and the principal agency with coastal security 
functions is the U.S. Coast Guard, the executive branch shall construe this provision as 
referring to the Coast Guard."); Statement on Signing the Vicksburg National Military 
Park Boundary Modification Act of 2002, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1745, 1741i 
(Oct. 11, 2002) (noting that there was a missing word between "Secretary" and "add" and 
concluding that Congress intended the missing word to be "shall"). 
51. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 40 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2l.J24, 2!)21i (Dec. 8, 2004) ("As is consistent with the princi-
ple of statutory construction of giving effect to each of two statutes addressing the same 
subject whenever they can co-exist, the executive branch shall construe the provision in 
the Energy and Water Appropriations Act under the heading 'National Nuclear Security 
Administration, Weapons Activities' concerning transfer of funds from the Department 
of Defense to constitute an 'express authorization of Congress' to which section 8063 of 
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-287) refers."). 
52. See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemen-
tal Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influ-
enza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005). 
53. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764-69 (2006). 
54. See Christopher S. Kelley, Rethinking Presidential Power-The Unitary Execu-
tive and the George W. Bush Presidency 34-39 (Apr. 2005) (paper prepared for the 63d 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association), available at http:// 
www. pe gc. us/archive/Unitary% 20Exccu ti ve/k ell y _unit_ exec _a nd_bush. pdf. 
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ments. 55 As we noted earlier, it was also reported in April 2006 
that President Bush had already asserted the authority to disre-
gard "more than 750 laws since he took office," something "un-
precedented in US history. "56 Senator Specter has noted that, 
"[t]here is a sense that the president has taken the signing state-
ments far beyond the customary purview. "57 The political scien-
tist Phillip Cooper contends that President Bush has "expanded 
the scope and character of the signing statement. "58 
In this section, we try to evaluate this claim, focusing on a 
comparison between Bush's practice and Clinton's. Clinton's 
signing statements provide a natural basis for comparison be-
cause Clinton was Bush's immediate predecessor and belonged 
to the other party. Of course, there is no reason to think that 
Bush's practice should be identical to Clinton's. They could have 
good-faith disagreement about the scope of executive power. In 
addition, the circumstances of the two administrations are dra-
matically different-with Clinton's taking place during a time of 
peace and optimism, and Bush's, except for part of the first year, 
occurring after the 9/11 attacks. These attacks allowed Bush to 
invoke the tradition of deference to the executive during military 
emergencies, and perhaps made him and his subordinates more 
aggressive about asserting presidential powers vis-a-vis Congress 
in his signing statements. We will return to these issues shortly. 
We begin with some numbers. Although Christopher Kelley 
and others have provided useful statistics regarding signing 
statements, there is uncertainty about how to categorize the 
statements (and Kelley has himself revised his statistics because 
of this),59 so we started from scratch and compiled our own sta-
tistics. We coded all of the statements issued from Carter 
through Bush II, using the three categories of "rhetorical," "con-
stitutional," and "interpretive." For the constitutional category, 
55. See, e.g., Susan Page, How Bush Has Asserted Powers of the Executive, USA 
TODAY, June 6, 2006, at 2A; The Week, The Heat Is On: July 23-29, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 
2006, § 4, at 2; Editorial, Read the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2006, at A18. 
56. Savage, supra note 6, at A1; see also Boston Globe, Number of New Statutes 
Challenged, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/04/30/statutes_ 
challenged/ (providing chart, which purports to show that the first President Bush chal-
lenged 232 laws; Clinton challenged 140 laws; and Bush II challenged "at least 750" 
laws). 
57. Weisman, supra note 9, at A9. 
58. Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10, at 516; see also Lithwick, supra note 5 
("[T]he difference between President Bush's use of the statements and that of his prede-
cessors is a matter of frequency and kind."). 
59. See And Then Spoke the ABA, http://www.users.muohio.edu/kelleycslmediablog. 
html (July 24,2006, 18:00). 
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we also counted all sections within a bill concerning which con-
stitutional concerns were being raised. Finally, we computed 
yearly averages for the various figures. Because the coding re-
quires judgment, it is not surprising that our statistics differ in 
some respects from those compiled by others. But the major pat-
terns are the same, and so we are confident that our picture, in at 
least rough outlines, is correct. 60 Table 1 provides the data. 
Table 1 
Carter Reagan Bush Clinton Bush 
I II 
Signing Statements, 225 250 228 381 132 
Aggregate 
- rhetorical 193 164 121 311 25 
- constitutional Hi 61 98 65 104 
- legislative history 16 29 21 12 27 
SS's Containing Challenges, 32 86 107 70 106 
Aggregate 
Sections Challenged, 39 129 169 144 844 
Aggregate 
- SS's with challenges to an 2 4 29 12 14 
undefined number of sec-
tions 
Average SS's Per Year 56 31 57 48 25 
- average rhetorical per 48 21 30 39 5 
year 
- average constitutional per 4 8 24 8 20 
year 
- average legislative history 4 4 5 2 5 
Q_er _year 
Average Yearly SS's with 8 11 27 9 20 
Challenges 
Average Yearly Sections 10 16 42 18 162 
Challenged 
- average yearly SS's with 1 1 9 1 2 
challenges to an unde-
fined number of sections 
*Note: Bush's aggregate number !s through June 2006; his averages ex-
clude 2006 because It was an mcompfete year. Rhetorical signing 
60. We did not do the coding ourselves but used a law student research assistant 
who was directed to apply the categories specified in the table. 
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statements are purely rhetorical; no legislative or constitutional claims 
are made. Unlike others before us, we classify signing statements as 
"cC?nstitutio':lal'.' or "legislative. history" onlY. if. they contain legal 
cla!ms .. A s1gmng stat~ment w1th both ~onst1tut10nal and legislative 
cla1ms 1s counted once m row 2 and once m row 3, but only once in row 
1 .. We have separated out signi!lg statements that challenge an unde-
fmed number of statutory prov1s10ns, and do not attempt to estimate 
how many are in fact challenged. Numbers have been rounded. 
This table does show that Bush's practice has been quantita-
tively unusual, but not in the simple way reported in the press. It 
is important to distinguish the number of signing statements that 
a president issues and the number of challenges to statutory pro-
visions that he makes in his signing statements. In the first cate-
gory, Bush does not differ much from his predecessors. In five 
and one half years (ending June 30, 2006) he issued 132 signing 
statements, fewer than Carter issued in four years. Bush issued 
fewer signing statements on an annual basis (25) than any of his 
predecessors in our table, and indeed back to President Ken-
nedy.61 
Moreover, even if one considers only signing statements 
that challenge statutory provisions, Bush is on the high end but 
still not outside the historical norm. His 20 signing statements 
per year with constitutional challenges are substantially higher 
than Clinton's (8) and Reagan's (8) but lower than G.H.W. 
Bush's (25). When one includes challenges based on legislative 
history, Bush's number remains at 20 while Clinton's rises to 9 
and G.H.W. Bush's rises to 27. 
However, Bush has clearly departed from the norm by fre-
quently issuing challenges to numerous statutory provisions 
within a single signing statement. As of June 2006, Bush had 
challenged more than 800 statutory provisions, which is much 
higher than any prior president. On average, Bush challenged 
162 statutory provisions per year; by contrast Clinton challenged 
18 and G.H.W. Bush challenged 42. A typical Bush signing 
statement that is not purely rhetorical might challenge a half-
dozen or more statutory provisions; other presidents would typi-
cally challenge only one or two62 - though Clinton in some cases 
61. See Kelley, supra note 15, app. 3.1 at 192 (providing support of the approximate 
number of signing statements per year, on average: Ford-54; Nixon-30; Johnson-60; 
Kennedy-27). 
62. Compare Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and 
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY 
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 170 I (Nov. 10, 2005), with Statement on Signing the Department of 
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1674 (Sept. 
30, 1994). 
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challenged a large number of provisions,63 and both presidents 
sometimes challenged an undefined number of provisions.64 
Before we discuss why Bush's practice might depart from 
that of his predecessors, we should provide some context. Eight 
hundred "provisions" sounds scary, but a statutory "provision" 
challenged in a signing statement is typically just a few lines, 
sometimes a bit more. Thus, in an average year during which 
Bush challenges 162 provisions, one might usefully think of this 
as the equivalent of about four to five pages of statutes. During 
this average year, Bush will have signed about 200 laws with an 
aggregate page total of around 35,000. Thus, although Bush has 
challenged many more statutory provisions than his predeces-
sors, the fraction of statutory material that he has challenged 
remains trivial, less than 1/lOOOth. To be sure, some one-
sentence statutory provisions are of great significance, and many 
others are of little importance; but this is just to say that num-
bers do not tell one much about whether the Bush administra-
tion's behavior has been important or not. 
What accounts for the substantial increase in the frequency 
of challenges within particular signing statements? It cannot be 
attributed to an increase in the number of statutes or statutory 
provisions, or an increase in the length of statutes, as far as we 
can tell.65 Nor does it seem likely that the 2001-2006 Congresses 
enacted more constitutionally problematic legislation than the 
1993-2000 Congresses. Although legislation relating to the war 
on terror and war in Iraq might pose more potential conflicts 
with executive authority than peacetime legislation, many of the 
constitutional challenges are not related to foreign affairs, and 
Congress during much of the 2001-2006 period was of the same 
party as the president and thus if anything less likely to include 
provisions that the president believed to be objectionable.66 
63. E.g., Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995,1 PUB. PAPERS 807 (Apr. 30, 1994). 
64. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1997, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1645 (Sept. 23, 1996); Statement on Signing the Energy and 
Water Development Appropriations Act, 2002, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1389 (Nov. 12, 2001). 
65. Fewer statutes were enacted annually during the Bush administration than in 
prior administrations. The numbers are as follows: Carter-311; Reagan-308; G.H.W. 
Bush-310; Clinton-232; G.W. Bush-211. (Westlaw Pub. Law database) (excludes 
2006). The average length of statutes (in pages) for Clinton and G.W. Bush were roughly 
the same, indicating that the length or complexity of statutes is not likely the source of 
the difference in the frequency of challenges. 
66. One can imagine explanations for why constitutional signing statements would 
go up with a same-party Congress-for example, a same-party Congress might enact 
bolder legislation, or might include problematic provisions for symbolic value while tac-
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One possibility, of course, is that the Bush administration 
has challenged more provisions because it has significantly 
broader views of executive power than the Clinton administra-
tion. We acknowledge this possibility, but we would note that 
the text of the signing statements do not by themselves provide 
compelling support for it. Rather, when one compares the word-
ing of the Bush II and Clinton signing statements, there are strik-
ing similarities. 
As we noted above, Bush has objected to provisions direct-
ing the executive branch to submit proposals or recommenda-
tions to Congress on particular topics, on the ground that they 
interfere with the constitutional authority of the president to 
"recommend ... such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient." Clinton used the same language in a signing state-
ment for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997: 
Section 4422 of the bill purports to require the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to develop a legislative proposal 
for establishing a case-mix adjusted prospective payment sys-
tem for payment of long-term care hospitals under the Medi-
care program. I will construe this provision in light of my con-
stitutional duty and authority to recommend to the Congress 
such legislative measures as I judge necessary and expedient, 
and to supervise and guide my subordinates, including the re-
view of their proposed communications to the Congress. 67 
Bush has objected to provisions that restrict the president's 
ability to appoint officers or vest appointment authority in enti-
ties other than the president, on the ground that they violate the 
Appointments Clause. Clinton raised an Appointments Clause 
objection in the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1997: 
One section of the Act, Section 1002, raises a constitutional 
concern. This section establishes a committee empowered to 
select the entities to which certain historic lighthouses will be 
conveyed. Because the committee members will hold a Fed-
eral office and because this section vests them with significant 
authority, they must be appointed as officers pursuant to the 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Act, however, 
provides that the Secretary of Transportation "shall" appoint 
four of the committee's five members from among persons 
recommended or designated by certain Maine officials or or-
itly accepting the president's authority to ignore them-but these explanations are very 
speculative. 
67. Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1053, 
1054 (Aug. 5, 1997) (emphasis added). 
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ganizations. The Appointments Clause does not permit such 
restrictions to be imposed upon the executive branch's powers 
of appointment. Therefore, I will not interpret section 
1002(d)(3)(A) of the Act as binding, and I direct the Secre-
tary of Transportation to regard the designations and recom-
mendations arising from it as advisory only.68 
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Bush has objected to provisions requiring the submission of 
information to Congress, on the ground that they may interfere 
with the president's authority to withhold information for vari-
ous reasons, such as harm to national security. In signing a Joint 
Resolution concerning U.S. policy towards Haiti, President Clin-
ton stated: 
In signing this joint resolution, it is important to clarify the in-
terpretation of a provision related to the President's authority 
and responsibility as Commander in Chief. 
Section 2 of the resolution calls, inter alia, for a detailed de-
scription of "the general rules of engagement under which 
operations of the United States Armed Forces are conducted 
in and around Haiti." I interpret this language as seeking only 
information about the rules of engagement that I may supply 
consistent with my constitutional responsibilities, and not in-
formation of a sensitive operational nature.69 
Bush has objected to provisions directing the executive 
branch to take particular positions in international negotiations 
or before international bodies, or to report on international ne-
gotiations, on the ground that they interfere with the president's 
68. Statement on Signing the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1869, 1870 (Oct. 19, 1996); see also Statement on Signing the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,2 Pus. PAPERS 1645 (Sept. 23, 1996). We are not 
claiming that the Bush and Clinton administrations had precisely the same views of the 
scope of the Appointments Clause. The Clinton administration apparently viewed the 
Clause as limited to persons employed to hold a federal office, see The Constitutional 
Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
124, 140 (1996), whereas the Bush administration apparently has a broader view that ex-
tends the Clause to persons exercising federal power. Our claim is simply that Clinton, 
like Bush, was vigorous in asserting Appointments Clause objections. See also Memo-
randum from Christopher Schroeder, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to the Counsel to the President (July 1, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
olc/barsh2.htm (concluding that congressional restriction on qualifications for U.S. Trade 
Representative violated the Appointments Clause and could be disregarded by the 
President). 
69. Statement on Signing Legislation Regarding United States Policy Towards 
Haiti, 2 Pus. PAPERS 1897, 1897 (Oct. 25, 1994), available at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/wslindex.php?pid=49382. 
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management of foreign affairs. In his signing statement for the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 1997, Clinton said: 
Provisions purporting to require the President to enter into or 
report on specified negotiations with foreign governments, as 
well as a provision that limits the information that could be 
revealed in negotiations, intrude on the President's constitu-
tional authority to conduct the Nation's diplomacy and the 
President's role as Commander in Chief. I will interpret these 
. . 70 prov1s1ons as precatory. 
Bush has objected to provisions that limit the use of U.S. 
armed forces, on the ground that they interfere with the presi-
dent's Commander in Chief authority. Clinton raised the same 
objections in his signing statement for a 1993 appropriations bill: 
However, I do have serious reservations about a provision in 
section 8151 of this Act. I construe section 8151(b)(2)(ii) as 
not restricting my constitutional responsibility and authority 
as Commander in Chief, including my ability to place U.S. 
combat forces under the temporary tactical control of a for-
eign commander where to do otherwise would jeopardize the 
safety of U.S. combat forces in support of UNOSOM II. Such 
U.S. combat forces shall, however, remain under the opera-
tional command and control of U.S. commanders at all 
times.71 
Bush has objected to provisions that regulate how actions 
are to be taken within the executive branch, on the ground that 
they interfere with the president's authority to supervise the 
"unitary executive branch." By contrast with the Bush admini-
stration, Clinton never invoked the term "unitary executive" in 
his signing statements. However, he did make the identical com-
plaints, without using this term. For example, his signing state-
ment for the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 said: 
Section 4422 of the bill purports to require the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to develop a legislative proposal 
for establishing a case-mix adjusted prospective payment sys-
tem for payment of long-term care hospitals under the Medi-
care program. I will construe this provision in light of my con-
stitutional duty and authority to recommend to the Congress 
70. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1645, 1646 (Sept. 23, 1996); see also Statement on Signing the Cu-
ban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERT AD) Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 433 
(Mar. 12, 1996). 
71. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1958, 1958 (Nov. 11, 1993). 
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such legislative measures as I judge necessary and expedient, 
and to supervise and guide my subordinates, including the re-
view of their proposed communications to the Congress.72 
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Similarly, in signing the Treasury and General Government Act, 
President Clinton stated: 
Section 640 of the bill prohibits the use of appropriations to 
pay the salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Gov-
ernment who interferes with certain communications or con-
tacts between other Federal employees and Members of Con-
gress or congressional committees. I understand this provision 
is intended to protect "whistleblower" employees who wish to 
inform the Congress of evidence of violations of law or other 
wrongdoing in the Government. Any broader interpretation 
of the provision that would apply to "nonwhistleblowers" 
would raise substantial constitutional concerns in depriving 
the President and his department and agency heads of their 
ability to supervise and control the operations and communica-
tions of the executive branch. I do not interpret this provision 
to detract from my constitutional authority in this way. 73 
The central tenets of the unitary executive theory are "the 
president's power to remove subordinate policy-making officials 
at will, the president's power to direct the manner in which sub-
ordinate officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the 
president's power to veto or nullify such officials' exercises of 
discretionary executive power."74 If this definition is correct, 
then it appears to us that Clinton's signing statements reflect this 
theory. 7 
Bush also has frequently objected to legislative veto and 
approval provisions on the ground that they are inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha. 76 Clinton 
did the same in a number of signing statements.77 
Finally, we should mention that Clinton, like Bush on occa-
sion, used signing statements to advance interpretations of the 
72. Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 2 PlJB. PAPERS 1053, 
1054 (Aug. 5, 1997) (emphasis added). 
73. Statement on Signing the Treasury and General Government Appropriations 
Act,1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1339, 1340 (Oct. 10, 1997) (emphasis added). 
74. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary 
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004,90 IOWA L. REV. 601,607 (2005). 
75. The theory itself is quite controversial in academia, and it is probably no coinci-
dence that Clinton did not use the term itself. 
76. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
77. E.g., Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appro-
priations Act of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 636 (Apr. 26, 1996). 
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legislative history unconnected to any constitutional concerns. 
For example, in signing the Federal Aviation Reauthorization 
Act in 1996, President Clinton stated: 
I am very disappointed that the Congress included a contro-
versial amendment of the Railway Labor Act in this legisla-
tion without the benefit of public debate or hearings. I have, 
however, signed H.R. 3539 into law because the sponsors of 
the amendment and the Committee of Conference have as-
sured me that section 1223 merely restores the exact legal 
standards for coverage under the Railway Labor Act as they 
existed prior to the effective date of the ICC Termination Act 
of 1995. Neither the amendments to the Railway Labor Act, 
nor the fact that it has been amended, should be interpreted 
as affecting coverage under the Railway Labor Act.78 
Clinton's and Bush's signing statements have many other 
similarities. Clinton, like Bush, objected to numerous different 
provisions in large bills, such as appropriations bills. 79 Both 
presidents interpreted statutory language narrowly in order to 
avoid constitutional problems, and in similar ways-for example, 
interpreting mandatory language as precatory.80 
If Bush and Clinton rely on similar or even identical theo-
ries of executive power in their signing statements, what ac-
counts for the difference in the frequency with which they chal-
lenge statutory provisions? One possibility is that the similar 
language in their statements masks important jurisprudential dif-
ference~, which can be discovered only by consulting Office of 
Legal Counsel memoranda, litigation positions, the give-and-
take with Congress reflected in letters and other formal commu-
nications, and actual presidential orders. 81 This possibility is 
78. Statement on Signing the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1796,1797 (Oct. 9, 1996). 
79. Compare Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1843 (Oct. 23, 1998), with 
Statement on Signing the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurri-
cane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2385 (Oct. 
13, 2004). 
80. Compare Statement on Signing the International Religious Freedom Act of 
1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1883 (Oct. 27, 1998), with Statement on Signing th.: Maritime 
Transpnrtaticm Security Act of 2002. 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2095 (Nov. 25, 
2002). 
81. With respect to the Bush administration, critics would likely cite to, among 
other things, OLC's original torture memo and the administration's position with respect 
to NSA surveillance. The degree to which the administration's position in these contro-
versies is consistent with the views of prior administrations, and the degree to which they 
are representative of the positions generally taken by the Bush administration with re-
spect to executive power, are beyond the scope of this article. 
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widely believed, but there are grounds for skepticism. The two 
Office of Legal Counsel memoranda most prominently invoked 
by Bush II during the current signing statements controversy 
were written by Clinton's Assistant Attorney General, Walter 
Dellinger.82 In addition, Clinton's Justice Department advanced 
a number of expansive interpretations of presidential power-
for example, in commenting on a bill that would have prohibited 
Clinton from using appropriations to fund American troops un-
der UN command unless he informed Congress of his intention 
fifteen days in advance, the Office of Legal Counsel argued that 
such a provision violates both the commander-in-chief clause 
and the president's constitutional authority to conduct diplo-
macy.83 Until detailed comparative academic work has been 
done, we think it premature to assume that Bush has issued 
more challenges in his signing statements because he has signifi-
cantly different views about executive power, though of course 
this may turn out to be correct. For now, the point to understand 
is that theories articulated in the signing statements do not them-
selves provide evidence that Bush and Clinton have significantly 
different views about the scope of executive power. 
Another possibility is that Bush uses essentially the same 
constitutional theories as Clinton does, but applies them more 
systematically. Perhaps the Bush administration is like a lawyer 
who writes "privileged and confidential attorney work product" 
on every document he prepares, even when it is extremely 
unlikely that the document will ever be subject to discovery. The 
Justice Department has long made it a practice of sending "bill 
comments" to Congress, which object to constitutionally prob-
lematic provisions in pending bills, especially provisions that in-
fringe on executive power. 84 The bill comment practice is routine 
and bureaucratic; it is intended to prevent Congress from inter-
preting a president's silence about constitutionally problematic 
bills as evidence that he is yielding his powers. The practice ap-
pears to have migrated to the signing statement, perhaps because 
a statement issued at the signing of the bill makes clear that any 
problems identified earlier were never corrected. 
The 9/11 effect may also be a major explanatory variable. 
Bush did not challenge any provisions on commander-in-chief 
82. See supra note 20 and infra note 96. 
83. See Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational 
or Tactical Control, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel182 (1996). 
84. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitwion in Execu-
tive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 711-12 (2005). 
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grounds prior to 9/11. 85 Since 9/11, he has issued thirty-six sign-
ing statements that include challenges on commander-in-chief 
grounds, or about five per year. Moreover, national security-
related legislation, a significant part of the statutory landscape 
after 9/11, is more likely to raise issues about the scope of execu-
tive power. 
Even if Bush's signing statements are qualitatively different 
from Clinton's, the significance of this difference is open toques-
tion. Several considerations need to be addressed. 
First, are the constitutional claims mostly political rhetoric 
or does Bush act on them? Often, he says (like other presidents) 
that he is not required to give notice to Congress about troop 
deployments but will when practicable. In practice, does Bush 
provide more or less notice to Congress than prior presidents 
have done? A related question is whether the provisions being 
challenged are important or trivial. As far we have found, the 
critics of the Bush administration's use of signing statements 
have not identified a single instance where the Bush administra-
tion followed through on the language in the signing statement 
and refused to enforce the statute as written. Christopher May 
has shown that presidents usually do not press the constitutional 
claims that they make in signing statements-often because con-
flicts never arise in the first place (for example, Congress does 
not exercise a legislative veto that the president repudiates ).86 
Second, are the claims justified or unjustified? This is an ex-
tremely difficult question. Clinton and Bush agree that the 
commander-in-chief clause restricts Congress's control of mili-
tary personnel. But how great is this restriction? As a matter of 
constitutional theory and political morality, there is no obvious 
answer.87 Former Clinton officials argue that Bush's views about 
executive power are unreasonable, whereas Clinton's were rea-
85. But there is a confounding factor, which is that presidents generally do not use 
signing statements aggressively in their first year, perhaps because their attention is fo-
cused on the transition from the prior administration. 
86. See May, supra note 15, at 937-45. 
87. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring) ("These cryptic words [of the Commander in Chief Clause] have 
given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional history."). 
Similarly, with respect to the unitary executive, compare Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1153 (1992), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Ad-
ministration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). On the scope of presidential power generally 
compare EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957: 
HISTORY A:-;D ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION (4th rev. ed. 1957), with CLINTON 
ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1st ed. 1956). 
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sonable.88 We accept the possibility that Clinton's views and 
Bush's views, although similar in broad contours, differ in impor-
tant respects, but it is hard to control for the different circum-
stances of their administrations. It is also much more difficult 
than the Bush critics imply to argue that one president's view is 
superior to the other's on normative grounds. Such an argument 
depends on a theory of presidential power, which is a deeply 
controversial subject. 
Third, if Bush is indeed staking out broader constitutional 
claims than other recent presidents, to what extent is this simply 
an effort to recapture presidential authority lost in the 1970s? It 
has been widely reported that Vice-President Cheney has made 
a conscious effort to do this, and signing statements may be part 
of this effort. 89 
Finally, it is possible that other presidents have used other 
instruments than Bush for achieving the same ends. Perhaps, for 
example, other presidents may have used executive orders or 
formal directives where Bush uses signing statements.90 We sus-
pect that in many cases presidents did not issue signing state-
ments and simply refused to comply with statutory provisions 
that they objected to, and Congress did not object; or if Congress 
did object, presidents defended themselves by letter or else 
yielded to the pressure. If the only difference between Bush and 
these other presidents is that he more often stated his objections 
in advance in a signing statement, then this is hardly a matter of 
concern. 
All of this suggests that the Bush administration critics' fo-
cus on signing statements is misguided. If critics seek to attack 
the Bush administration's views about executive power, they 
need to focus on other documents such as Office of Legal Coun-
sel memoranda, and examine the administration's actions as well 
as its words. Presidents before Bush have staked out strong posi-
tions on executive privilege, immunity of the president to crimi-
nal indictment, and related issues; all of these positions, and ac-
tions based on them, need to be considered as well as signing 
88. See, e.g., Symposium, War, Terrorism and Torture: Limits on Presidential Power 
in the 21st Centurty, 81 IND. L.J. 1139 (2006). But cf JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER 
MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR ch. 7 (2006) (arguing that 
Clinton's and Bush's views of the commander-in-chief power are the same). 
89. See John Yoo, Editorial, How the Presidency Regained its Balance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2006, § 4, at 15. 
90. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 14, at 2285-99 (documenting Clinton Administra-
tion's frequent use of orders and directives). 
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statements. If the critics believe that the signing statement itself 
is constitutionally problematic, then they should not focus on 
Bush. They should complain about the signing statement prac-
tices of Clinton, Reagan, Truman, FDR, and even James Mon-
roe. But we will not let this inconsistency prevent us from inquir-
ing into the legal and normative basis of the signing statement 
critique, the subject of Parts III and IV. 
III. LEGAL CRITIQUES OF SIGNING STATEMENTS 
Critics have questioned the legality of presidential signing 
statements when they are used for purposes other than political 
rhetoric. In this Part, we consider the principal legal arguments 
that have been made against signing statements. As we explain, 
most of the legal arguments boil down to either disagreement 
with the perceived substantive claims being made in the state-
ments or a concern about judicial deference to the claims and 
therefore do not provide a basis for concluding that the state-
ments themselves are legally problematic. In this Part, we ad-
dress the legal issues. Many critics also suggest that the phe-
nomenon of signing statements has negative institutional 
effects-for example, on the balance of power between the legis-
lative and executive branches-without necessarily suggesting 
that these negative effects result in illegality. We address these 
institutional arguments separately in Part IV. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 
Critics have raised several legal objections to constitutional 
signing statements-that is, statements in which the president 
raises constitutional concerns about bills that the president has 
signed. Before considering these objections, we need to highlight 
a preliminary issue that relates to these objections. The issue is 
whether the president has a constitutional duty to enforce laws 
that he believes are unconstitutional. 
Commentators are divided over this issue.91 Some commen-
tators argue that presidents must always enforce a statute, re-
gardless of whether they believe it to be constitutional, unless 
and until courts hold that the statute is unconstitutional.92 Other 
91. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objec-
tionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 14--22 (Winter/Spring 2000) (describing 
the debate). 
92. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381 
(1986); May, supra note 15; ArthurS. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the 
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commentators argue that in the absence of a judicial resolution 
of the issue, presidents have no obligation to enforce a statute 
that they believe to be unconstitutional- and, indeed, may have 
an obligation not to enforce the statute.93 Still other commenta-
tors argue for an intermediate position whereby presidents may 
sometimes disregard statutes that they believe to be unconstitu-
tional, such as when a statute violates a Supreme Court prece-
dent or invades executive power.94 There is also a related debate 
over the extent to which presidents should presume statutes to 
be constitutional.95 
Perhaps not surprisingly, presidents have often claimed the 
authority to disregard statutes that they believe to be unconstitu-
tional. As Walter Dellinger has noted, executive branch 
"[ o ]pinions dating to at least 1860 assert the President's author-
ity to decline to effectuate enactments that the President views 
as unconstitutional."96 Even before that, there are examples of 
presidents declining to enforce statutes because of constitutional 
concerns-for example, Jefferson declined to continue prosecu-
tions under the Sedition Act because of First Amendment con-
cerns.97 In the modern era, both Republican and Democratic 
presidents have claimed that they are not bound by provisions in 
the War Powers Resolution because these provisions unconstitu-
tionally infringe on the commander-in-chief clause or-what is 
the same thing-have interpreted the Resolution narrowly so as 
not to constrain them.98 Another, less controversial example is 
Laws, 40 V AND. L. REV. 389, 395-98 (1987). 
93. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
905 (1990); John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Re-
view, 84 VA. L. REV. 333 (1998); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 217 (1994); see also David Barron et al., Untangling the Debate on Signing State-
ments, http:/ /gulcfac. typepad.com/georgetown_ university _law/2006/07 /thanks_to_the_p. 
html (July 31, 2006). 
94. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 91. 
95. See, e.g., id.. at 35 (arguing for presumption of constitutionality). 
96. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President para. 3 (Nov. 
2, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oldnonexcut.htm. 
97. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 57, 58 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) ("I affirm 
that act to be no law, because in opposition to the constitution; and I shall treat it as a 
nullity, wherever it comes in the way of my functions."). 
98. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETI, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE CRS-2 (Nov. 15, 2004) ("(S)ince the War 
Powers Resolution's enactment, over President Nixon's veto in 1973, every President has 
taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by the Congress on the 
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief."), available at http://www.fas. 
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the frequent statement by presidents that they are not bound by 
one-house or legislative committee veto provisions, in light of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha.9 On several occasions 
in different administrations, the Attorney General or the Justice 
Department's Office of Legal Counsel has expressed the view 
that ~residents may decline to enforce unconstitutional stat-
utes.1 ° Equally unsurprisingly, Congress has sometimes con-
tested the proposition that the president may refuse to enforce 
statutes that he views as unconstitutional. Indeed, the asserted 
basis for impeaching (and almost convicting) President Andrew 
Johnson was his refusal, on constitutional grounds, to comply 
with the Tenure of Office Act, which was enacted over his 
veto. 101 
The Supreme Court has not definitively addressed this is-
sue, although some of its decisions and statements could be read 
as providing modest support for a presidential power to disre-
gard at least some unconstitutional statutes. Justice Jackson's 
celebrated concurrence in Youngstown assumes that under some 
circumstances courts will uphold presidential actions "incom-
patible with the expressed or implied will of Con~ress," although 
such actions will be "scrutinized with caution." 02 In Myers v. 
United States, the Court agreed with the President that a statute 
that required Senate approval for removal of the postmaster was 
unconstitutional, and the Court did not comment negatively on 
org!man!crs/IB81050.pdf; Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into 
Bosnia, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel327 (Nov. 30, 1995) ("The Executive Branch has tradi-
tionally taken the position that the President's power to deploy armed forces into situa-
tions of actual or indicated hostilities is not restricted to the three categories specifically 
marked out by the Resolution."). 
99. Even before Chadha, a number of presidents had expressed the view that they 
were not bound by legislative veto provisions. See Paulsen, supra note 93, at 267. 
100. See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 96; Issues Raised by 
Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 18 (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oldgray.11.htm; Issues Raised by 
Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 37 (1990); Constitution-
ality of Congress' Disapproval of Agency Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to 
the President, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21 (1980) (opinion on Attorney General Ben-
jamin R. Civiletti). 
101. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC 
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 226--
27 (1992). 
102. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). The much-discussed footnote 23 in the recent Hamdan decision is 
not inconsistent with this proposition: it states that the president may not disregard limi-
tations enacted by Congress "in proper exercise of its own war powers," suggesting that 
the president may be able to disregard limitations imposed by Congress that exceed its 
war powers. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006). 
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the President's refusal to comply with that statute. 103 And four 
Justices in Freytag v. Commissioner stated in passing that the 
president has the power "to disregard [laws encroaching on his 
authority] when they are unconstitutional." 104 
We take no position on this issue because it is orthogonal to 
the legality of constitutional signing statements. If it is proper for 
presidents to at least sometimes refuse to enforce statutes that 
they think are unconstitutional, then announcing such an inten-
tion in a signing statement cannot be illegal, and indeed it may 
be desirable to have the president state his intention in this re-
gard at the earliest possible moment so that Congress and poten-
tial litigants can take it into account. 105 Of course, presidents will 
sometimes make invalid assertions of unconstitutionality, and 
they may have an incentive to take aggressive positions with re-
spect to presidential power in particular. This simply means, 
however, that the substantive views expressed in signing state-
ments will sometimes be legally problematic, not that the phe-
nomenon of signing statements is itself legally problematic. On 
the other hand, if one believes that presidents should never de-
cline to enforce statutes based on an assertion of unconstitution-
ality, then one will also believe that they should not issue signing 
statements claiming this authority. But the problem here will be 
the underlying views expressed in the statements, not the state-
103. 272 u.s. 52 (1926). 
104. 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). Two circuit courts (one in a withdrawn opinion and the other in dicta) have 
expressed the view that the president has a duty to enforce statutes that he believes to be 
unconstitutional. See Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 809 F.2d 979 (3d 
Cir. 1986); Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part, 893 
F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989). 
105. Congress has enacted a statute providing that: 
The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in 
which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice ... es-
tablishes or implements a formal or informal policy to refrain ... from enforc-
ing, applying, or administering any provision of any Federal statute ... whose 
enforcement, application, or administration is within the responsibility of the 
Attorney General or such officer on the grounds that such provision is unconsti-
tutional .... 
28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(l) (2006). Such a report must be made within 30 days after the pol-
icy is implemented, and must "include a complete and detailed statement of the relevant 
issues and background (including a complete and detailed statement of the reasons for 
the policy or determination ... )." /d. § 530D(c)(2). In signing the latest version of this 
statute, President Bush stated that "[t]he executive branch shall construe [this section 
and related provisions] in a manner consistent with the constitutional authorities of the 
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the dis-
closure of which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties." 
Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authoriza-
tion Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1971, 1971 (November 2, 2002). 
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ments themselves. 106 Moreover, even if presidents accepted the 
view that they had to enforce all statutes, constitutional signing 
statements could still play a useful informational role- for ex-
ample, presidents could use them to state that they were enforc-
ing a statute under protest, and perhaps also to direct executive 
branch lawyers not to defend the constitutionality of the statute 
in litigation. 
With these points in mind, we now consider the legal objec-
tions to constitutional signing statements. One argument is that 
these statements constitute an abuse of the veto process set forth 
in the Constitution. 107 The Presentment Clause of the Constitu-
tion provides that bills that are approved by the House and Sen-
ate shall be presented to the president and that, if he approves 
the bill "he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Ob-
jections to the House in which it shall have originated."108 If the 
president returns a bill, Congress then has the constitutional au-
thority to enact the bill into law over the president's objection 
upon a two-thirds vote in both Houses.109 The president improp-
erly circumvents this process, the argument goes, if he signs a bill 
and then states in a signing statement that he has constitutional 
objections to it. In that situation, unlike with a veto, the bill is 
not returned to Congress to give it an opportunity to enact the 
bill into law over the president's objection. 
This argument is unpersuasive, for several reasons. First, in 
the signing statement, the president is not purporting to use his 
presidential authority to block enactment of the law, which is 
what happens with a veto. Instead, he is claiming that the Consti-
tution itself blocks the law from taking effect. He may or may 
not be right about such a claim, but his position is different from 
when he exercises a veto. For example, unlike with a veto, the 
president cannot validly use a signing statement to announce 
that he will not enforce a statute merely because he disagrees 
with it as a matter of policy. 
Second, the effect of the signing statement is also different 
from that of a veto. Among other things, the statute remains on 
the books, available for application by courts (if they find it to be 
106. Some critics are concerned that signing statements will make it easier for presi-
dents to assert non-enforcement authority. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10. No one has 
explained why this might be so, however. 
107. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 18-19; May, supra note 15; Bruce 
Fein, Commentary, Great Usurpations, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at A15. 
108. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2. 
109. /d. 
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constitutional) or by a subsequent president with different con-
stitutional views. By contrast, a bill that is vetoed never becomes 
law, for either the courts or the executive, unless and until it is 
reenacted by a supermajority of Congress. 
Third, it is unlikely that a constitutional signing statement 
changes the outcome that would result if the bill were instead re-
turned to Congress and then reenacted over the president's veto. 
In either case, if the president believes that he should not exe-
cute unconstitutional laws, then he will not do so. 
Finally, the president and his subordinates can uncontrover-
sially announce their views about the constitutionality of a stat-
ute in other contexts-in internal communications within the ex-
ecutive branch, for example. Indeed, the Justice Department's 
Office of Legal Counsel does this routinely. It is difficult to see 
why it suddenly becomes legally problematic for the president to 
state such views in a signing statement. 
A related argument is that constitutional signing statements 
constitute improper "line-item" vetoes. 110 The Supreme Court 
has held that a line-item veto, whereby a president cancels or al-
ters legislation after it is enacted, is unconstitutional even if ap-
proved in advance by Congress. 111 When he states in a signing 
statement that he will not give effect to a statutory provision be-
cause he believes it to be unconstitutional, the argument goes, he 
is in effect exercising a line-item veto. Indeed, unless his objec-
tion relates to the entire bill in all of its applications, which is 
unlikely, then the president can be seen as accepting the portions 
of the legislation that he approves and canceling those portions 
that he disapproves, or "cherry-picking" the legislation, which is 
exactly what would happen with a line-item veto. 
This argument is also unpersuasive, for essentially the same 
reasons why the veto abuse argument is weak. When the presi-
dent issues a constitutional signing statement, he is not purport-
ing to use any executive authority to cancel all or part of a stat-
ute. He is making a claim about the effect of the Constitution on 
110. See, e.g. Time Change, supra note 41 (statement of Bruce Fein, Partner, Fein & 
Fein); COOPER, supra note 16, at 203--D6 (describing certain uses of signing statements as 
fiscal and substantive line-item vetoes); Cooper, Use and Abuse, supra note 10, at 531 
(asserting that signing statements "can and have been used as line-item vetoes of legisla-
tion presented to the president for signature or veto but without the use of the formal 
veto or the opportunity for legislative override processes"); see also Lear Siegler v. Leh-
man, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir. 1988), wilhdrawn in part, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989); 
ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 18. 
111. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417,421 (1998). 
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the legal effect of the statute. He may also be signaling his un-
willingness to enforce a statutory provision that he believes is 
unconstitutional in the absence a judicial resolution of the mat-
ter, something that he could do outside the context of a signing 
statement. If it is improper for him to decline to enforce a statute 
in that situation (an issue on which, as discussed above, we take 
no position), then it will be improper regardless of the signing 
statement. Conversely, if this is a proper course of action, it is 
hard to see how making that intention clear in a signing state-
ment renders it illegal; indeed, one might think that generally it 
is better for the president to make clear his views in this regard 
so that Congress can react if it so wishes. 112 
Moreover, whether a president's refusal to enforce a statute 
will have the effect of preventing a provision from being en-
forced will depend on a variety of factors, including the availabil-
ity of judicial review. If judicial review is available, courts will 
make their own assessment of the president's constitutional ar-
gument, and they are unlikely to give substantial deference to 
the president's views of the Constitution. If they nevertheless 
agree with the president's argument, then it will be the judges' 
construction of the Constitution, not the political authority of 
the president, that nullifies the provision, and the courts can also 
make a judgment about whether the provision is severable from 
the rest of the legislation. In the absence of judicial review, the 
matter will be resolved, like most separation of powers issues, 
through the political process. It is not clear that the mere fact of 
the signing statement will affect how that process comes out, and 
certainly critics have not presented any empirical evidence show-
ing such an effect. 
A different (and better) version of the veto abuse argument 
and the line-item veto argument is the claim that the president 
has a constitutional duty to veto statutes he believes to be un-
constitutional. The argument here is that the president's oath of 
office and the Take Care Clause require him to enforce the Con-
stitution, and that he violates this duty if he si?ns into law a stat-
ute that he believes to be unconstitutional. 11 Under this argu-
112. To be sure, not all signing statements are clear. Some of them are vague, and we 
are not claiming that Bush or any other president has used signing statements in some 
sort of ideal way. Even the vague ones, however, provide more information than silence 
would. Moreover, vagueness may also reduce the effect of a signing statement on the ac-
tions of executive branch subordinates in implementing a statute, something critics arc 
concerned about. 
113. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 19. 
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ment, it may be proper for a president to decline to enforce a 
statutory provision that he believes to be unconstitutional if it 
was signed into law by a predecessor or enacted over his veto, or 
if he discovers the constitutional problem only after enactment, 
but he should never sign a bill into law if he believes at that time 
that it has an unconstitutional provision. This argument has 
some formal appeal, although it is subject to the counterargu-
ment that the president's act of signing does not give the provi-
sion legal effect, since an unconstitutional law has no legal effect. 
As a result, as long as he makes clear that he is not sanctioning 
the unconstitutional provision, the president is not violating his 
oath to uphold the Constitution merely by the act of signing; 
rather, he would violate his oath only if he enforced the uncon-
stitutional provision. Signing and enforcement, in other words, 
may not be formally comparable. 114 To be sure, if a president be-
lieved that all or most of bill was unconstitutional, the argument 
for some sort of duty to avoid sanctioning the bill through signa-
ture would be stronger, although this scenario rarely comes up. 
In any event, we believe that the argument that a president must 
always veto a bill if it has what he believes to be an unconstitu-
tional provision is unrealistic in an age of omnibus legislation: 
presidents are often presented with dozens and even hundreds of 
provisions in a bill, often on multiple subjects, and as a political 
matter they will not be able to veto such bills simply because of 
constitutional concerns about a particular provision. 115 The ar-
gument is particularly unrealistic once it is remembered that the 
asserted unconstitutionaliW often relates merely to possible ap-
plications of the provision. 16 
Critics also have challenged the invocation of constitutional 
concerns in signing statements to justify particular statutory in-
terpretations. When presidents have constitutional concerns, it is 
rare for them to announce in a signing statement that they will 
decline to enforce a statutory provision. Instead, they frequently 
114. Some people have argued that if the president can sign laws with provisions that 
he believes unconstitutional despite his oath, then Congress would be able to enact laws 
it believes unconstitutional despite the members' oaths. It is not clear that this would be a 
problem-Congress could simply expect the president and courts to refuse to give legal 
effect to laws found to be unconstitutional- but in any event the president has a better 
argument that he respects his oath by refusing to enforce unconstitutional provisions, 
whereas Congress has no such instrument for depriving its enactments of effect. 
115. On the rise of omnibus legislation, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE 
GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2[){)2, 70--80 (2d 
ed. 2005). It may be that some phenomenon (such as decentralization in Congress) has 
contributed both to the rise of omnibus legislation and the rise of signing statements. 
116. See Barron et al., supra note 93. 
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state that they will interpret the provision in a way that will 
avoid the purported constitutional problem. With respect to the 
ban on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees con-
tained in the Detainee Treatment Act, for example, President 
Bush stated that the executive branch would construe the ban 
"in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the 
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as 
Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional 
limitations on the judicial power. "117 Critics contend that this 
practice allows presidents to distort the meaning of statutes and 
thereby in effect disregard or change them. 
In considering this objection, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween situations in which a statute is truly ambiguous, and situa-
tions in which the president is purporting to interpret a statute 
when in fact his interpretation is contrary to its plain meaning. 
When a statute is truly ambiguous, it is difficult to see how it is 
legally objectionable for a president to adopt an interpretation 
that avoids constitutional concerns. 118 The Supreme Court regu-
larly applies such a constitutional avoidance canon when it con-
strues statutes. 119 One might object that merely invoking consti-
tutional "concerns" allows the president to disregard a greater 
number of statutory provisions than if he had to take a firm posi-
tion on its constitutionality. This problem has been noted with 
respect to judicial reliance on the constitutional avoidance 
canon. The objections to that canon as used by the courts, how-
ever, are less applicable to the president. Critics have noted that 
judicial underenforcement of statutes based on constitutional 
concerns will often be contrary to what Congress would have 
117. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in The Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic InOucnza 
Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005). 
118. For such a claim, however, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the 
Avoidance Canon, 81 INDIANA L.J. 1313, 1316 (2006). Powell contends that the judicial 
avoidance canon limits the judiciary's authority whereas the executive's use of the avoid· 
ance canon enhances the executive's authority. A problem with this argument is that it 
assumes particular baselines. Powell assumes that if a court did not use the canon it 
would have to strike down statutes, whereas if the executive did not use the canon it 
would have to enforce the statute. But we could switch baselines and start with the as· 
sumption that without such a canon the judiciary would strike down only clearly invalid 
statutes and that without such a canon the executive would refuse to obey ambiguously 
invalid statutes. For additional discussion of the usc of the avoidance canon by the execu· 
tive branch, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitwional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006). 
119. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555-56 (2002); Communications 
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,762 (1988). 
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wanted. 120 Unlike the courts, however, the president is a partici-
pant in the enactment of legislation, as well as the actor respon-
sible for enforcement of the legislation, so he has a stronger 
claim than the courts to decide on underenforcement. Indeed, 
outside the context of signing statements, the executive branch 
in a host of situations uncontroversially decides on the level of 
f . . 121 enforcement o statutory proviSions. 
Moreover, for many of the constitutional interpretive 
statements, it is not clear that there will even be underenforce-
ment. Many of the statements appear simply to be placeholders 
to preserve an executive viewpoint about the Constitution, not 
an indication that the executive will decline to fully enforce a 
statute. 122 Indeed, some of them specifically note that, despite 
the alleged constitutional problems, the executive will enforce 
the statute "as a matter of comity." 123 And many statements, 
perhaps most, address contingencies that might never arise. For 
example, when the president invokes the commander-in-chief 
clause in order to justify interpreting a statutory reporting obli-
gation so that it does not interfere with national security, he does 
not thereby announce that he will ignore the law, because the 
reporting requirement may never conflict with national security. 
Similarly, the controversial statement for the Detainee Treat-
ment Act does not assert that that the President will ignore the 
law. Even in situations in which he believes that he has the con-
stitutional authority to disregard the Act, he (or his subordi-
nates) might nevertheless comply with it for policy reasons. 124 As 
120. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71. 
121. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (finding that agency decisions 
not to exercise enforcement authority are presumptively not subject to judicial review); 
Teah R. Lupton, Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1283-84 (2002) (discussing 
the limited constraints on prosecutorial discretion). 
122. See Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 41 (statement of Michelle E. 
Boardman) ("Many constitutional signing statements arc an attempt to preserve the en-
during balance between co-equal branches, but this preservation does not mean that the 
President will not enforce the provision as enacted."); Savage, supra note 6, at A1 
("Nothing in the world changes by the publication of a signing statement. The statements 
merely serve as public notice about how the administration is interpreting the law." 
(quoting Jack Goldsmith, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel)). 
123. E.g., Statement on Signing Legislation to Address the Participation of Taiwan 
in the World Health Organization, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1070 (Jun. 14, 2004); 
Statement on Signing the Strengthen AmcriCorps Program Act, 39 WEEKLy COMP. 
PRES. Doc. 876 (July 3, 2(XJ3); Statement on Signing Legislation Concerning Participa-
tion of Taiwan in the World Health Organization, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 679 
(May 29, 2003). 
124. According to news reports, after the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act, 
the Central Intelligence Agency largely halted its overseas interrogation program for 
high-level terrorist suspects. See Guy Dinmore, CIA Forced Bush Hand on Secret Pris-
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a result, it is not clear that a higher number of constitutional 
signing statements correlates with increased presidential non-
compliance with statutes. Richard Epstein has argued that sign-
ing statements could be the "opening wedge to a presidential 
posture that judicial decisions may limit the president's ability to 
use courts to enforce his policies, but cannot stop him from act-
ing unilaterally." 125 But Epstein cites no evidence that Bush, who 
has been in office for more than five years, has begun acting uni-
laterally in a way that is contrary to judicial decisions, and Bush's 
decision to comply with decisions like Hamdan suggest the con-
trary. Applying an "opening wedge" argument to Bush is also 
odd; such an argument would have been more appropriately ap-
plied to Reagan or to an even earlier president who used signing 
statements, and yet the general growth of executive power aside, 
no one thinks that earlier signing statements have enabled presi-
dents to ignore judicial decisions. 
B. INTERPRETIVE SIGNING STATEMENTS 
Interpretive (or legislative history) signing statements also 
have generated controversy. Critics contend that, if courts give 
weight to these interpretive statements, it will undermine separa-
tion of powers. 126 Giving weight to these statements, the argu-
ment goes, will in effect allow the president to legislate without 
following the process for legislation set forth in Article I of the 
Constitution. Relatedly, critics suggest that if courts give weight 
to signing statements, the president will in effect have the ability 
to exercise a veto over legislation without being subject to hav-
ing the veto overridden as provided for in Article I, or will in ef-
fect be exercising a line-item veto. 127 Alternatively, critics con-
tend that if courts give weight to interpretive signing statements 
they will be improperly abdicating their authority to interpret 
the law. 128 Consequently, the critics argue, signing statements 
"should be given no weight by a court when interpreting the in-
tent of Congress. " 129 
There are a number of problems with this argument. As an 
initial matter, it is important to note that the argument is not an 
ons, FINAI'CIAL TIMES, Sept. 21,2006, at 1. 
125. Epstein, supra note 10. 
126. See, e.g., Garber & Wimmer, supra note 1; William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of 
Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991). 
127. Garber & Wimmer, supra note 1, at 375-76. 
128. /d. at 384--85. 
129. /d. at 368. 
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objection to signing statements per se. Rather, the objection is to 
the possibility that courts will give weight to such statements 
when interpreting statutes. It is not clear at this point, however, 
whether and to what extent courts will give weight to these 
statements. 130 Nor have presidents claimed that the signing 
statements are controlling on the courts. 131 In addition, the ar-
gument fails to distinguish between various degrees of weight 
that courts might give to signing statements. We are not aware of 
anyone who argues that these statements should be dispositive 
or should trump clear statutory language. The real issue, there-
fore, is whether they should be given some weight when statu-
tory meaning is otherwise ambiguous, in the same way that 
courts often give weight to pre-enactment statements by mem-
bers of Congress or congressional committees. If one concludes 
that signing statements are a relevant piece of evidence concern-
ing statutory meaning, then relying on such statements would 
not amount to a veto or alteration of the legislation. 
Moreover, the proposition that it violates separation of 
powers for courts to give any weight to statutory interpretations 
by the executive that are announced after a bill is signed into law 
is in tension with modern administrative law. Courts routinely 
give deference to post-enactment statutory interpretations by 
executive branch agencies- under the Chevron and Skidmore 
doctrines, for example. Courts give this sort of deference to ex-
ecutive agencies because of their expertise and because Congress 
often expects that agencies will fill in gaps and ambiguities in en-
actments. Moreover, courts reason that if Congress disagrees 
130. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), the Supreme Court majority did 
not even mention, let alone give weight to, the President's interpretation of the Detainee 
Treatment Act in his signing statement, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent. See id. 
at 2816 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A survey of judicial opinions with the phrase "signing 
statement" in them suggests that courts cite them to bolster an interpretation of Con-
gress's intent for which there is other evidence in the legislative history but do not give 
them much, if any, independent weight. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.l 
(1986) (noting without comment that President's signing statement expressed view that 
act is unconstitutional); United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (not-
ing that Clinton statement is consistent with conference report); United States v. Gon-
zalez, 311 F.3d 440, 443 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 
466, 488(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Eisenhower signing statement and other legislative history 
to show that pledge statute was meant to be coercive); Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 
1087 n.4 (9th Cir.1999) (citing signing statement for meaning of statute in dicta); United 
States v. Story, 891 F.2d 988, 994(2d Cir. 1989) (using a Reagan signing statement, among 
other factors, to resolve contlicting interpretations in the House and Senate legislative 
history); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1181 n.38 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting 
that signing statement is consistent with House report). 
131. See Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 41 (statement of Michelle E. 
Boardman) ("Signing statements, of course, are not binding on the courts .... "). 
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with the agency's interpretation, it has the ability to override the 
interpretation through new legislation. These justifications will 
likely apply to at least some interpretive signing statements. 132 
In addition, critics of signing statements do not contend that 
it violates separation of powers for courts to give weight to con-
gressional materials when interpreting statutes.133 Instead, they 
argue that signing statements should not be considered because 
these statements, unlike congressional materials, do not help re-
veal the intent of members of Congress. 134 It is not clear from the 
text or structure of the Constitution, however, why the views of 
the president are not relevant to the interpretation of legislation. 
Article I provides that, absent a supermajority, Congress cannot 
enact legislation without the signature of the president. In light 
of the difficulty of overriding a presidential veto, this means that 
for most legislation the president is a necessary partner with 
Congress in the enactment process. Since legislation reflects an 
agreement between Congress and the president, the president's 
views about the agreement would seem to be as relevant as Con-
gress's views. 135 
To be sure, at the signing statement stage, the president may 
have more ability to engage in cheap talk than a legislator com-
menting on a bill, because signing statements occur after enact-
ment and thus after Congress can revise the bill in reaction to 
the statement. A better argument against giving weight to inter-
132. See Cross, supra note 1. Some scholars argue that interpretive authority is 
granted to the relevant agency, not to the president. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Presi-
denr's Stallltory Pov;ers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006). Even if 
this is correct, the agency head surely benefits from knowing the president's views as his 
job might depend on them, and agencies undoubtedly receive and respond to direction 
from the president. 
133. Some commentators and judges do argue that it is improper to look at legisla-
tive history when interpreting a statute. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-30 (1997). Presumably these 
commentators and judges would also disapprove of looking at presidential signing state-
ments when interpreting a statute. See, e.g., Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 41 
(statement of Prof. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Georgetown Law Center) (arguing that 
"the project of statutory interpretation is to discern 'the original meaning of the text, not 
what the original draftsmen intended,"' and that "presidential signing statements-like 
legislative history-are of very little usc in that project"). 
134. Garber & Wimmer, supra note 1, at 370,392. 
135. See Cross, supra note 1, at 218 ("[S]o long as the President influences legisla-
tion, there is persuasive reason for courts to consider the text of presidential signing 
statements."); see also WILLIA~1 N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH 
GARRETT, CASES A;-.iD MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PCBLIC POLICY 996 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that, "for the same reasons that interpreters 
are usuallv interested in the views of the congressional sponsors, they might be interested 
in the vie~s of the President, who effectively sponsors much major legislation"). 
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pretive signing statements, therefore, is that they are unreliable 
indicators of presidential understandings of statutory meaning, 
and that they should be given no more weight than post-
enactment statements by members of Congress, which the Su-
preme Court has said provide "an extremely hazardous basis for 
inferring the meaning of a congressional enactment." 136 We ad-
dress this argument below in Part IV in comparing signing 
statements with pre-enactment legislative history. 
If courts do not give weight to interpretive signing state-
ments, it is difficult to see how they could be legally objection-
able. By necessity, the executive branch must interpret statutes 
in order to implement and enforce them. 137 The president must 
also interpret statutes in order to supervise the executive branch. 
If the president did not issue signing statements, he would simply 
use other vehicles for statutory interpretations, and those other 
vehicles would be less contemporaneous with the enactment of 
the legislation and often less public. Critics of executive power, 
however, usually favor greater transparency. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In this part, we consider signing statements from an institu-
tional perspective. Should presidents be criticized for and dis-
couraged from using signing statements? To answer this ques-
tion, one must identify the damage that signing statements do to 
the constitutional system. One might show, for example, that leg-
islative outcomes in a world without signing statements would be 
better than legislative outcomes in the world that we have. Un-
fortunately, given scholars' limited understanding of how 
American political institutions work, and the existence of serious 
controversies about how they should work, we cannot do more 
than provide a sketch of what a defense of signing statements 
would look like. But we think that this sketch should be enough 
to throw the burden back on the critics, who also need to over-
come the presumption in favor of signing statements given the 
lawfulness of signing statements and their historical pedigree. 
136. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 & 
n.l3 (1980); see also, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 135, at 996 (not-
ing "problems of reliability" with signing statements). 
137. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) ("Interpreting a law enacted by 
Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the 
law."); Easterbrook, supra note 93. -
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We will start with some basic assumptions that we take from 
the most sophisticated work on legislative institutions and statu-
tory interpretation, the literature on positive political theory 
(PPT). It turns out that many authors writing in this literature 
disapprove of signing statements, so we will take their argument 
as our foil. After describing the general approach of the litera-
ture to statutory interpretation, we will discuss the critics' argu-
ment. We then show that this argument is sustainable only on 
narrow and implausible or controversial assumptions. PPT, in 
fact, shows that signing statements do not raise distinctive prob-
lems in comparison with other legislative and executive docu-
ments. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The PPT literature treats statutes as the outcome of bar-
gains among various political actors who comprise the "enacting 
coalition." The enacting coalition consists of those parties whose 
approval was necessary for the enactment of the statute. Who 
belongs to the enacting coalition depends heavily on context, but 
roughly one can say that the coalition excludes people who vote 
against the bill and the extreme supporters whose preferences 
were not shared by those whose votes were necessary to create a 
majority. The coalition will also usually include committees 
whose approval is needed for a vote on the floor, the median 
voter in each house, and the gresident, unless he vetoed the bill 
and his veto was overridden. 1 
The members of the enacting coalition play the role that 
contract parties do in the economic analysis of contract law. In 
the contracts literature, scholars assume that the contracting par-
ties seek to make an agreement that maximizes the value of the 
relationship. A hypothetical, complete contract would assign 
rights and obligations for every possible contingency in a manner 
that maximizes value. Because of transaction or bargaining costs, 
however, the parties must leave "gaps" in the contract. The role 
of the court is to fill these gaps in a manner that maximizes the 
ex ante value of the contract-or, what is usually the same thing, 
that provides the parties what they would have bargained for if 
138. We are simplifying; for the full story, see McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use 
of Positive Political Theory in Stawtory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 21 
(Winter/Spring 1994); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in 
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 722-25 (1992). (McNollgast is the collective 
name used by Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast when writing to-
gether.) 
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they had anticipated, and bargained over, the contingency. One 
can similarly view legislation as having gaps because members of 
the enacting coalition cannot anticipate and bargain over all pos-
sible contingencies that affect the value of the legislative deal. If 
the analogy to contract law is right, then courts should fill the 
legislative gaps with the terms of a similar hypothetical bar-
gain- the terms that the parties would have chosen because they 
maximize the value of the legislative deal. 139 
There are important differences between the contractual 
and legislative settings. One can more reasonably assume that a 
deal that receives the consent of both contracting parties en-
hances their welfare and, externalities aside, therefore social 
welfare as well, than that a legislative deal that receives the con-
sent of members of the enacting coalition-a majority or per-
haps supermajority of a group who very imperfectly represent 
the interests of the public-maximizes social welfare. Nonethe-
less, the assumption that courts should fill legislative gaps with 
terms that the enacting coalition would have wanted rests on two 
plausible considerations. First, our political system is built on the 
assumption that Congress makes good law-or, at least, that new 
law is generally superior to the status quo. Courts do not have 
the authority to reject this assumption. Second, if courts did not 
enforce legislative intent when gaps exist, then Congress would 
respond by passing new, more detailed laws. The additional bar-
gaining and drafting costs would produce no offsetting bene-
fits.140 
McNollgast and other authors argue that the enacting coali-
tion's intention-a compromise of everyone's most preferred 
version of the law-should be considered the meaning of the 
statute. However, the statements of the members of the enacting 
coalition during the legislative process do not necessarily reveal 
the coalition's intention. The problem is that often a member 
lacks an incentive to disclose the compromise meaning of the 
bill. A person who preferred a more extreme or moderate ver-
sion of the bill would like courts to interpret the compromise 
language in the more extreme or moderate way. If the courts 
rely on legislative history, that person has an incentive to insert 
statements in the legislative history with his preferred meaning. 
139. See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 138, at 708-15. 
140. On the other hand, if courts cannot reliably determine legislative intent, then 
they should refuse to fill gaps, thus encouraging Congress to write more detailed statutes. 
See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). 
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McNol\sast argues that these statements should be given no 
weight. 1 
By contrast, some statements are credible, or at least more 
credible, because the speaker would incur a cost if he said some-
thing else. For example, if a committee report interprets com-
promise language in an extreme fashion, then the majority will 
vote down the bill. If the committee prefers the compromise lan-
guage to no bill at all (the status quo), it would do better tore-
port the accurate interpretation than the extreme interpreta-
tion.142 Therefore, the committee report's statement is (usually) 
credible. 143 Similarly, language in an amendment that is voted 
down by the majority on the floor provides a clue, by way of 
negative inference, of the meaning of the bill. Here the major-
ity's vote is the credible statement; if the majority voted in favor 
of the amendment, it would be worse off on the assumption that 
it prefers the unamended version of the bill. 144 
In sum, when using legislative history, courts should focus 
(1) on the statements of members of the enacting coalition, (2) 
when those statements are credible because the member has an 
incentive to speak truthfully or at least partially truthfully. 
B. SIGNING STATEMENTS 
How do these considerations bear on presidential signing 
statements? Initially, to keep the discussion simple, we will limit 
our focns to signing statements that provide an interpretation of 
the statute based on nonconstitutional considerations. Further, 
we will assume that a court will give weight to the signing state-
ment in future litigation. We will relax these assumptions in Sec-
tion C. 
The first criterion is that the president be part of the enact-
ing coalition. As McNollgast acknowledges, the president will 
almost always be a member of the enacting coalition because he 
has the veto. Because Congress must craft the bill in such a way 
as to avoid the veto, the bill will almost always reflect the presi-
dent's preference-except when the veto is overridden, in which 
case no signing statement will be issued. 145 To be sure, there are 
141. McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 138, at 737. 
142. !d. at 722-24. 
143. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 138, at 27-28. 
144. /d. at 26. 
145. For an exhaustive analysis and empirical evidence, see CHARLES M. CAMERON, 
VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE POWER (2000); see 
also GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002); 
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some circumstances where technically the president's preference 
does not affect the content of the bill. For example, if the presi-
dent seeks a moderate bill that slightly changes the status quo, 
the relevant players in Congress seek a more extreme bill, but 
the president also prefers the extreme bill to the status quo, then 
Congress's preferences will determine the content of the bill; the 
president's is irrelevant. 146 But as McNollgast acknowledges, 
these sorts of situations are more hypothetical than real; the 
president's influence is pervasive. The veto power is significant; 
also the president can sometimes set the agenda by proposing 
legislation and using his political and institutional resources (in-
cluding his leadership of one of the political parties in Congress) 
to focus Congress's attention on his proposal. Therefore, it 
seems appropriate to assume that the president is always a 
member of the enacting coalition except when his veto is over-
ridden. 
The second criterion is that the president's signing state-
ment be credible. McNollgast argues that it will not be credible 
because it occurs after Congress has voted. Congress does not 
have the opportunity to reject the president's statement; there-
fore, the president will state his preferred interpretation rather 
than the actual compromise interpretation. 147 One might argue 
that the president's signing statement is in this way no different 
from the statements made by individual members of Congress 
who do not hold committee or other leadership positions, or in-
deed from the statements made by members of Congress after 
the bill has been passed and signed. 148 
To understand this argument, consider the following exam-
ple. Suppose a liberal president supports a bill that prohibits cer-
tain emissions of a certain quantity but would strongly prefer a 
bill that bans these emissions altogether. The bill is ambiguous in 
Steven A. Matthews, Vew Threals: Rhewric in a Bargaining Game, 104 Q. J. ECO'.'. 347 
(1989). 
146. McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 138, at 722-23. 
147. McNollgast, Legis/alive Intent, supra note 138, at 28; McNollgast, Positive Can-
ons, supra note 138, at 726-27; McNollgast, Commentary, The Theory of Interpretive 
Canon and Legislative Behavior, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 235, 237 (1992) (repeating 
this conclusion but also seeming tJ qualify it); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. 
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 
I964 Civil Rights Act and Its Imerpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1446 & n.91 (2003); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statwory Interpretation and Political Advamage, 12 INT'L REV. L. 
& ECON. 217, 227-28 (1992) (expressing skepticism about the value of signing state-
ments). 
148. However, this type of material is sometimes used by courts. See ESKRIDGE, 
FRICKEY & GARRETT, mpra note 135, at 1018. 
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part because of different views within the enacting coalition, 
most of whose members prefer the more conservative version of 
the bill and would not vote in favor of the liberal interpretation. 
Thus, the "intention" of the enacting coalition is the conserva-
tive interpretation-the emissions are limited, not eliminated. 
The president stays quiet during legislative deliberations while 
members of Congress advance the conservative interpretation of 
the bill. The bill passes with a bare majority in each house. In the 
signing statement, the president for the first time advances the 
liberal version of the bill. If he expressed this view prior to the 
final vote, and courts would accept this view, the bill would not 
have received a majority because a majority would not vote for a 
bill that would be given the president's interpretation by courts 
in subsequent litigation. 
Thus, if courts gave weight to the president's signing state-
ment, it would thwart the will of the enacting coalition. One view 
is that this is the wrong outcome in itself; but even if one does 
not hold this view, one must recognize that judicial deference to 
the signing statement would create all kinds of difficulties. Next 
time around, Congress knows in advance that the president will 
say one thing (or nothing) prior to the vote and something else 
after the vote. As a result, Congress may vote down bills whose 
compromise meaning it supports. Another possible consequence 
is that members of Congress will need to extract a commitment 
from the president not to advance a new interpretation in the 
signing statement. Even if the president can make a credible 
commitment, the additional bargaining costs are a deadweight 
loss. A third possible consequence is that Congress will need to 
expend additional time and energy crafting a bill that is detailed 
enough to foreclose an interpretation the president would be 
likely to advance in a signing statement. In these ways, giving 
weight to the signing statement interferes with desirable legisla-
tion without having an offsetting benefit. 
This is the argument of McNollgast and other authors. We 
think it suffers from several difficulties. 
First, the president's statements in general are more credi-
ble than those of members of Congress because the president is 
a more significant and visible figure, and he is more of a repeat 
player; thus, he has more to lose if he loses credibility. A presi-
dent whose signing statement violates legislative bargains will 
have more trouble obtaining Congress's cooperation later on. 
He also might earn the distrust of other political actors and vot-
ers. In other contexts McNollgast seems to agree that general 
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considerations of reputation encourage political actors to be 
honest. They point out that committee chairs have an incentive 
to be honest because they fear retaliation by the con9ressional 
leadership which can deprive them of their positions. 49 But if 
this is true for committee chairs, it is also true for the president. 
Congress, members of his party, interest groups, and other par-
ties with something at stake in the legislative process will refuse 
to cooperate with him in the legislative process if he reneges on 
earlier deals by issuing inconsistent signing statements. 
Second, the president's signing statement is not like the 
statement of a member of Congress who is outside the enacting 
coalition or who has no incentive to speak sincerely because the 
vote is past. The distinction is that the president will usually have 
a significant role in the administration and enforcement of the 
statute, whereas the member of Congress does not. 150 This is true 
for an ordinary criminal statute that is enforced by U.S. Attor-
neys or the Justice Department; regulatory statutes that are en-
forced by administrative agencies such as the EPA; and even 
laws creating private rights of action, at least to the extent that 
these laws overlap with other statutes that the president enforces 
or have some relationship to the president's constitutional pow-
ers such as his authority over foreign relations. 
Thus, the statute in question may delegate authority to the 
president, and even when it does not do so formally it will usu-
ally quasi-delegate, in the sense of implicitly permitting the 
president to use discretion in enforcing the statute. Political sci-
entists generally support delegation from Congress to the presi-
dent, citing the advantages for Congress to leaving difficult pol-
icy questions to expert agencies that build up institutional 
capacity in particular areas of policy. 151 In doing so, Congress 
takes the risk that the president will direct agencies to enforce 
laws in a manner that deviates from Congress's intent, but Con-
gress can reduce this risk in two ways. First, it can use the Sen-
ate's advice-and-consent power, as well as Congress's general 
authority over personnel decisions, to ensure that the agency's 
149. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 138, at 26; see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 
265 (1994). 
150. See Cross, supra note 1, at 218. However, Cross is more skeptical than we are 
because he fears opportunism on the part of the president. /d. at 224. We address this 
concern below. 
151. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE 
POWERS (1999). 
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preferences do not diverge too far from Congress's. Second, it 
can monitor the agency's behavior and use the diverse tools at its 
disposal-control over appropriations, oversight hearings, re-
fusal to cooperate with the executive in subsequent legislative 
initiatives, providing for judicial review, 152 impeachment, and so 
forth- to punish agencies that interpret laws in a manner that 
diverges too far from Congress's intention. Congress does not 
exercise perfect control over agencies, but the enormous advan-
tages in institutional division of labor outweigh the costs. 
For similar reasons, conventional wisdom approves of quasi-
delegations of power to the executive whenever statutes that re-
quire executive enforcement are enacted. Prosecutorial discre-
tion in the enforcement of criminal statutes is just one of many 
manifestations of this view. 153 When prosecutorial discretion is 
abused, Congress can use its oversight tools to retaliate against 
the executive. So the possibility of exercising that discretion in 
advance, in the form of a signing statement, should not raise any 
concerns. Rather than classifying signing statements as insincere 
forms of legislative history, one can more usefully think of them 
as policy statements by the executive that are constrained in the 
same way that all other exercises of delegated authority are. 
Third, as noted above, PPT's main assumption-that legisla-
tive cost reduction is the goal of canons of statutory interpreta-
tion-ignores serious controversies about the legislative process. 
An alternative view is that the president more accurately repre-
sents the preferences or interests of the public as a whole than 
Congress does, because only the president has a national con-
stituency.154 If we reject PPT's extreme pro-Congress assump-
tion, then it is simply ambiguous whether the additional bargain-
ing power that the president receives in a world in which courts 
give weight to signing statements enhances or reduces public 
welfare. 
152. If Congress is worried that a president will misinterpret or decline to en-
force/comply with a statute (whether through a signing statement or not), it can (within 
the broad bounds of Article III standing) provide for judicial review. Importantly, it did 
not do so in the Detainee Treatment Act - indeed, it did the opposite. Senator Specter 
recently introduced legislation that would purport to give Congress standing to seek judi-
cial review of claims made in presidential signing statements and direct courts to ignore 
signing statements when interpreting legislation. See Presidential Signing Statements Act 
of2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006). 
153. See, e.g., Lupton, supra note 121. 
154. For a recent summary of the vast literature that takes this view, with pertinent 
citations, see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of The Nationalist President and the Parochial Con-
gress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1226-31 (2006). Nzelibe himself rejects this view. 
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Although the danger of post-enactment opportunism by the 
president is real, this is something that can be constrained by 
courts. Courts can decide to give more or less weight to the 
president's views relative to Congress's when deciding how to 
interpret a statute. Courts that believe that the president has bet-
ter incentives than Congress might give more weight to the sign-
ing statement than to ordinary legislative history, but that does 
not mean that the court would accept any kind of signing state-
ment. Taking a cue from Chevron, 155 a court might give weight to 
a signing statement that provides a reasonable interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute. Courts can also evaluate the credibility of 
the interpretive signing statements based on a variety of factors 
including consistency with prior signing statements and with 
statements by the president and other executive officials in the 
legislative history, the consistency of signing statements with the 
statements of members of Congress in the legislative history, the 
extent to which the statements generate disagreement from 
members of Congress, and so forth. 
We can join the second and third points under the general 
claim that in the post-Chevron world signing statements are no 
more objectionable than exercises of presidential power that are 
now seen as routine and uncontroversial. Chevron dealt with 
formal delegations of power from Congress to the executive 
branch; but its rationales for judicial deference to executive in-
terpretations of ambiguous statutes in such cases can be ex-
tended to signing statements. The two rationales for Chevron 
deference were the superior accountability and expertise of the 
executive. 156 Our first point was about expertise: the president's 
enforcement authority gives him expertise about how statutes 
should be implemented. Our second point was about account-
ability: the president is more accountable to the public than 
courts are, and thus more likely to act in the public's interest. In 
Chevron, the Supreme Court used these rationales to justify def-
erence to the interpretations of agencies that have formal rule-
making or adjudicatory power. Similarly, the president's exper-
tise and accountability provide courts with a reason to give 
weight to signing statements rather than relying on their (the 
courts') own ability to resolve ambiguous language. 157 
155. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc .. 467 U.S. 837 
(1984 ). 
156. See id. at 865-66. 
157. For a similar argument, see Cross, mpra note I, at 229-31. Political scientists 
generally support congressional delegation of authority to agencies for Chevron-style 
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As we have noted, this reasoning has, in fact, been used by 
courts to justify deference to executive interpretations of statutes 
in various settings outside the Chevron setting. For example, 
courts give weight to executive interpretation of statutes that af-
fect foreign relations. 158 Similarly, they give weight to executive 
interpretations of treaties. 159 When an agency does not have the 
power to issue formal rules that interpret the statute, the inter-
pretation must be contained in other documents-memoranda, 
proclamations, executive orders, internal guidance statements, 
and so forth. If it is more convenient to advance these interpreta-
tions in signing statements, there is no reason to object to this 
practice. Indeed, in some contexts it may be preferable to have 
the president commit to an interpretation before specific contro-
versies over the meaning of the law arise. In doing so, the Presi-
dent enhances transparency about his legal views and enforce-
ment agenda. This proposition is also reflected in the 
disallowance of Chevron deference to executive litigating posi-
tions, which seems to be based on the concern that litigating po-
sitions might not reflect the considered view of the executive, or 
might be advanced for narrow political reasons. Because signing 
statements generally are made in advance of any particular dis-
pute, 160 and reflect the views of the president himself, it is less 
likely that they are similarly tainted. 16 
reasons. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 151. For a general discussion, see 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CH!. L. 
REV. 1721 (2002). For an important exception, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Perc-
john, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmak-
ing in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165 (1992), who argue that 
Chevron upset the constitutional balance between the executive and Congress by ena-
bling the executive to advance interpretations of statutes contrary to the enacting coali-
tion's intention. In our view, Eskridge & Ferejohn give too little weight to Congress's 
other means of control; do not adequately consider the possibility that economic and 
technological changes justify a shift in power; and also cannot account for the fact that 
Congress has continued to delegate substantial, discretionary authority to the president 
post-Chevron. See also Kagan, supra note 14 (endorsing broad administrative powers for 
the president on Chevron-like grounds). 
158. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 
649 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007). 
159. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669,2685 (2006). 
160. The signing statement issued in connection with the Detainee Treatment Act, 
however, occurred while litigation was pending challenging the administration's deten-
tion policies in the war on terrorism. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Hamdan 
disregarded the statement. 
161. We are not claiming that signing statements are entitled to deference under the 
Chevron doctrine per se. Among other things, the applicability of that doctrine to presi-
dential interpretations, as opposed to agency interpretations, is unsettled. See Acree v. 
Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 63 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring). More-
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C. COMPLICATIONS 
So far we have discussed interpretive signing statements. In 
this section, we expand our analysis by considering three addi-
tional issues. First, we address constitutional signing statements. 
Second, we relax our assumption that courts give weight to sign-
ing statements, and address the view that even if courts do not 
give weight to signing statements, it is still wrong for presidents 
to issue them. Third, we consider the differences between sign-
ing statements and other types of executive documents such as 
executive orders. 
1. Constitutional Signing Statements 
Many critics of signing statements have focused their atten-
tion on constitutional signing statements, statements that declare 
that the president will interpret the statute in a certain way, or 
not enforce certain provisions in the statute, because to do oth-
erwise would violate the constitution. Critics fear that presidents 
use constitutional signing statements in order to rationalize ex-
ecutive aggrandizement at the expense of Congress and other in-
stitutions. Consider President Bush's statement that he will in-
terpret a bill that bans certain cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment of detainees in a way that does not interfere with his 
commander-in-chief authority, implying that Congress cannot 
prevent the president from ordering subordinates to engage in 
such treatment during wartime. 162 Critics who believe that no 
reasonable interpretation of this statute would violate the presi-
dent's commander-in-chief authority assume that the president is 
implicitly proposing more expansive powers than he already has. 
And even when there is a potential conflict between the statute 
over, in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court held that 
Chevron deference is appropriate only when it is "apparent ... that Congress would ex-
pect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in 
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law," id. at 229, and it is not clear when this ex-
pectation applies with respect to the president. Rather, our claim is simply that the ra-
tionales for deference under Chevron provide support for giving at least some weight to 
signing statements, assuming that weight is given to other types of legislative history. 
Even when Chevron does not apply, lesser types of deference may be appropriate, such 
as "Skidmore deference," whereby the weight to be given to an interpretation "'will de-
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade.'" Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
u.s. 134, 140 (1944)). 
162. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense. Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations to Address Hurricane> in the Gulf of 'Vkxico, and Pandc-mic Influenza 
Act. ~1Xl6, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30. 21X15). 
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and the president's constitutional powers, one might fear that 
the president will use the statement to rationalize a refusal to en-
force that statute even when no such conflict exists. 
As we noted in Part III, a standard response to the critique 
of constitutional signing statements is that the president has a 
duty to comply with the Constitution-a duty that can be tied to 
the Take Care Clause, if need be. Thus, if the president believes 
that a statute violates the constitution, he has a constitutional 
obligation not to enforce it. 163 (As discussed above, the president 
may have a duty not to enforce an unconstitutional provision 
even if he does not have a duty to veto the provision.) Announc-
ing his view on this matter in advance, in a signing statement, is 
surely preferable to waiting until litigation arises. By stating his 
view in advance, the president gives Congress an opportunity to 
correct the statute, and also helps align citizens' expectations 
with the law as enforced. 
A critic might respond that the president should not exer-
cise independent judgment about the constitutionality of the 
statute. Congress's implicit determination that the statute is con-
stitutional is entitled to deference; or perhaps the president 
should suspend judgment until a court has ruled. These are all 
possible views, but they are hardly uncontroversial. Whatever 
the truth, our point here is narrow, and should by now be famil-
iar. The criticism is not of the signing statement but of the con-
tent of particular signing statements. If one believes that the 
president has the authority to refuse to enforce statutes that he 
deems to be unconstitutional, then the only possible objection to 
a signing statement that says as much is that it comes too soon. 
But we see no reason why the president should defer announcing 
his view until litigation occurs. If one believes that the president 
does not have the authority to refuse to enforce statutes that he 
deems to be unconstitutional, that by itself is not sufficient for 
criticizing the statement of his views in a signing statement. To 
hold that position, one would have to believe that the president 
would have to keep silent regarding his constitutional views 
about a statute, a position held by no one of whom we are aware. 
If the president has the right to state his views about the consti-
tutionality of a statute, then he should state his views sooner 
rather than later, in which case the signing statement would be 
the appropriate vehicle. And if the president's views about con-
stitutional power are excessive, a court is free to disregard them. 
163. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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The critic might also respond that the president should veto 
bills that contain provisions that he believes to be unconstitu-
tional rather than sign them and issue a signing statement an-
nouncing his intention not to enforce the offending provision. By 
vetoing such bills, the president would discourage Congress from 
enacting unconstitutional legislation in the first place. But noth-
ing is gained though such a course of action, and much is lost. 
Whether the president vetoes the bill or signs it but refuses to 
enforce unconstitutional provisions, the unconstitutional provi-
sions have no legal effect. Vetoing, then, just creates costs-
delay of enactment of the constitutional provisions or indeed 
failure of enactment altogether. 
The basic fear seems to be that the president will use the 
signing statement in an opportunistic fashion to advance imper-
missible theories of executive power, and that these theories 
might stick even if courts do not pass on them or even if they re-
ject them. How might such theories stick? We address this ques-
tion in the next section. 
2. Nonjusticiable Signing Statements and the Evolution 
of Constitutional Norms 
Even assuming courts do not pay attention to signing state-
ments, or are capable of discounting those that make extreme 
claims about executive power, there seems to be a lingering con-
cern that the signing statement provides the president with an 
excessively potent weapon in its continuing separation-of-powers 
battle with Congress. The concern, discussed in Part II, that the 
president could direct subordinates to disregard provisions of a 
statute can be recast as a fear that the president can too easily 
thwart the will of Congress. A related concern is that by persis-
tently advancing claims about executive power against an often 
weak-willed and divided Congress, the president will eventually 
persuade Congress, courts, or others that he has powers that he 
really lacks or ought to lack. So even if courts do not give weight 
to signing statements, they cause harm to constitutional norms 
and the division of powers between governmental units. 
This argument is vulnerable to two objections. First, no one 
fully understands how the president and Congress use their vari-
ous institutional advantages to encroach on the power of the 
other. Both sides have formidable tools at their disposal. The 
president is the focus of the nation's attention; he delivers na-
tionally viewed speeches; he controls the law enforcement activi-
ties of the executive branch; he can use executive orders and 
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proclamations; he can use the veto against statutes that implicitly 
deny him powers he thinks he has. In taking these actions, the 
president can argue that his constitutional powers are, or should 
be, greater than they in fact are (or should be), and if he per-
suades his audience, then his constitutional powers may indeed 
advance. But Congress can interrogate executive officials in 
oversight hearings; it can cut budgets, jurisdictions, enforcement 
powers; it can require reports and audits; it can (though the Sen-
ate) vet nominees and refuse to confirm them; it can order inves-
tigations of the president and his subordinates; it can impeach 
the president. Congress frequently passes bills with constitution-
ally dubious provisions that increase Congress's power: consider 
its continued use of one-House and committee veto provisions 
despite the Chadha decision. Congress frequently passes multi-
ple bills and omnibus appropriations bills that contain numerous, 
unrelated provisions. These bills put the president in a difficult 
position. As a practical matter, the president may need to sign 
these bills even if there are unconstitutional provisions. Yet it is 
not self-evident that his behavior is clearly objectionable if here-
fuses to subsequently enforce an unconstitutional provision. 
That this is a serious problem is recognized by many state consti-
tutions, which require the legislature to pass single-subject bills 
and give the governor a line-item veto. 164 
Given that both sides already have numerous tools for ad-
vancing their constitutional understandings, and that one cannot 
say whether the one side or the other has superior tools, what-
ever this might mean, it is impossible to say whether the signing 
statement gives the president a significant advantage over Con-
gress. It might give him no advantage, a small but reasonable ad-
vantage, or it might make up for numerous disadvantages. 
Second, one's position on these issues must depend on the 
resolution of a prior, equally difficult issue, namely whether the 
president already has "too much" or "too little" power relative 
to Congress. 165 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., thought that the presi-
dency was too powerful when he wrote his book, The Imperial 
164. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETI, supra note 135, at 330-31, 335-36; 
Courtney Paige Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislarive Chaos: Execurive Choice or Congres-
sional Responsibiliry?, 74 IOWA L. REV. 227,230 & 241 (1988). 
165. For discussion of this baseline problem, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Pow-
ers and Branches in Separarion of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001). The litera-
ture on the constitutional cont1ict between the president and Congress is vast. See, e.g., 
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT (4th ed. 1997); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Jnrerprer? The Quesr for rhe 
Ulrimare Consrirwionallnrerprerer, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986). 
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Presidency, in 1973. By the year 1998, he had come to believe 
that the president was no longer too powerful, but then he 
changed his mind when he wrote the preface to a second edition 
in 2004. 166 Schlesinger did not, at any time, provide a theory that 
explains how much power the president should have, so his 
judgments were no more than impressions. As we have noted, 
the executive has gained power throughout American history, 
and particularly during the twentieth century. Domestically, the 
president has become the leader of the regulatory state since the 
New Deal. Internationally, the president has increasingly en-
joyed freedom of action, at least since the Spanish-American 
War. One cannot criticize the use of presidential signing state-
ments to aggrandize executive power without being able to es-
tablish that the president currently, under the right understand-
ing of the Constitution and American political institutions, has 
the right amount of power or too much. Far too much contro-
versy exists on this issue for the criticisms of signing statements 
to be persuasive along this dimension. 
3. Executive Orders, Executive Memoranda, and 
Proclamations 
One of our recurrent arguments is that signing statements 
are just one of many tools that the president has at his disposal 
for controlling the executive branch. Other tools include execu-
tive orders, memoranda, proclamations, agency rules, and inter-
nal guidelines. To the extent that these other instruments are 
near substitutes for signing statements, then even some kind of 
prohibition of or taboo on signing statements, if this were possi-
ble, would have no effect on the conduct of the president. 167 
However, we have not gone so far as to say that signing state-
ments are identical to these other tools, and indeed they are not. 
Accordingly, signing statements may indeed have significance. 
The most interesting difference between a signing statement 
and the other types of documents is that a signing statement at-
taches itself to a statute, and so (if given weight by courts as leg-
islative history) may continue to have force after the termination 
166. SCHLESINGER, supra note 32, at ix-xxiv. 
167. See also T.J. Halstead, CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Signing State-
ments: Constitwional and lnstiturionallmplications, at CRS-26 (Sept. 20, 2006) ("It does 
not seem likely that a reduction in the number of challenges raised in signing statements, 
whether caused by procedural limitations or political rebuke, will necessarily result in 
any change in a President's conception and assertion of executive authority."), available 
at http://www. fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667. pdf. 
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of the administration, even if future presidents disavow it. For 
comparison, consider the executive order. At the beginning of 
their administrations presidents typically review executive orders 
from prior administrations, and repeal or modify those that they 
do not agree with. No one doubts that presidents can do this. 
Signing statements are anchored to statutes; executive orders 
float free. 
Now, a president could also use an executive order to dis-
avow a prior president's signing statement, or to instruct subor-
dinates to disregard claims made in that signing statement. How-
ever, it is imaginable that in future litigation a court could rely 
on the signing statement and disregard the disavowal. This could 
happen if courts regard the signing statement as a part of the leg-
islative history rather than as an independent statement of ex-
ecutive policy. When interpreting statutes, a court will rely on 
legislative history to some extent, but it does not always pay at-
tention to the interpretations of the current president. In this 
way a signing statement could be a more powerful way to affect 
interpretations of a statute than other executive instruments 
are- even more powerful than a formal agency rule under the 
Chevron doctrine, which permits new presidents to reject inter-
pretations of earlier presidents. 
We emphasize that this is a possible argument, and we do 
not know how courts will act. But if courts do accept this argu-
ment, we think that this would on balance be a good thing. The 
reason takes us back to the theory of statutory interpretation. As 
long as the president is a member of the enacting coalition, then 
his contemporaneous interpretation of the statute is entitled to 
respect. Just as courts rely on the enacting Congress's intention, 
not the intention of the Congress in session at the time of litiga-
tion, they should rely on the "enacting president's" intention, 
not the intention of the president in office at the time of litiga-
tion. Indeed, courts do routinely rely on statements issued b~ the 
executive branch regarding legislation under consideration.' 8 
CONCLUSION 
The critics confuse the medium and the message. The sign-
ing statement is a tool for expressing a president's view of a stat-
168. See OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 438 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the usc of testimony by executive branch adminis-
trators, their analvscs of bills, and messages from the president and his subordinates that 
propose or comm~nt on pending bills). 
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ute. The fact that presidents may use signing statements to ad-
vance erroneous views about their constitutional powers or the 
meaning of a statute is not grounds for criticizing the tool, just as 
policy disagreement about the use of the veto would not be 
grounds for criticizing the president's veto power. Like all tools, 
the signing statement can be used for good or for ill. Confusion 
about this point is evident in the debate about whether Bush has 
challenged "too many" statutory provisions in signing state-
ments, when the appropriate question is whether Bush's views 
about executive power are justified. 169 
If courts do not give weight to signing statements, then the 
objections to this tool are weak indeed. The signing statement is 
no more offensive than the memorandum, the executive order, 
and the proclamation, and no one seems to want to ban them. 
Whatever one's views of presidential power, the president has 
the right and perhaps even a constitutional obligation to state his 
opinion about the meaning of a statute and whether it violates 
the constitution. If it is more convenient to state this opinion in a 
signing statement than in some other type of document, that is 
hardly an objection. Indeed, stating his views about legislation at 
the earliest possible point increases transparency about the ex-
ecutive's intentions, which enables those who are affected by the 
statute to adjust their behavior accordingly, and those who dis-
agree with the president to mobilize resources to litigate or ob-
tain a legislative revision. 
If courts do give weight to signing statements, then critics of 
the signing statement should more appropriately complain about 
judicial than about presidential practice. But to the extent that 
courts legitimately defer or give weight to the executive's posi-
tion on some issue, and this is very common as we have dis-
cussed, then it seems that use of the signing statement should be 
encouraged rather than criticized. When the president expresses 
his view in advance rather than in litigation, there is less of a 
chance that the view is opportunistic or politically biased, as 
courts have recognized. The signing statement should thus be 
preferred to the litigation position. And occurring as it does at 
the earliest point at which the president can express his views 
about a completed statute (as opposed to bills earlier in the leg-
islative process), the signing statement is an attractive vehicle for 
doing so. 
169. See Walter Dellinger, Editorial, A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,2006, at 
A17. 
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We have also argued that if courts are correct to examine 
legislative history, then a signing statement should be examined 
as well, even though it comes after the vote. The president has 
legislative power embodied in his veto, and thus his views about 
legislation are entitled to some weight. The PPT models show 
that because Congress legislates under the shadow of the veto, a 
bill will reflect the president's view, even if only implicitly. And 
because the president will almost always play a role in the en-
forcement of a statute, his views about it, as embodied in the 
signing statement, are no more suspect than other instructions to 
subordinates. Because he is a usually a pivotal member of the 
legislative coalition, because he is usually charged with enforce-
ment in the statute, and because his enforcement of the statute is 
politically constrained, his statement will often provide useful in-
formation about the meaning of the statute. 
